Heterogeneous Verification of an Autonomous Curiosity Rover

Cardoso, Rafael C.; Farrell, Marie; Luckcuck, Matt; Ferrando, Angelo; Fisher, Michael

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-55754-6_20

Cited by 31 publications

(32 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Heterogeneous verification techniques were used to verify an autonomous Mars Curiosity rover simulation [8]. This work uses distinct verification methods for specific components but does explicitly link the verification artifacts produced.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent work argues that, for autonomous robotic systems, the use of multiple formal and non-formal verification techniques is both beneficial and necessary to ensure that such systems behave correctly [19,30]. Notably, the usually modular nature of robotic systems makes them more amenable to an integrated verification approach than monolithic systems [8]. The inherent modularity in robotic systems usually stems from the use of a node-based middleware such as the Robot Operating System (ROS) [39].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study

Bourbouh

Farrell

Mavridou

et al. 2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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The complexity and flexibility of autonomous robotic systems necessitates a range of distinct verification tools. This presents new challenges not only for design verification but also for assurance approaches. Combining the distinct formal verification tools, while maintaining sufficient formal coherence to provide compelling assurance evidence is difficult, often being abandoned for less formal approaches. In this paper we demonstrate, through a case study, how a variety of distinct formal techniques can be brought together in order to develop a justifiable assurance case. We use the AdvoCATE assurance case tool to guide our analyses and to integrate the artifacts from the formal methods that we use, namely: fret, cocosim and Event-B. While we present our methodology as applied to a specific Inspection Rover case study, we believe that this combination provides benefits in maintaining coherent formal links across development and assurance processes for a wide range of autonomous robotic systems.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study

Bourbouh

Farrell

Mavridou

et al. 2021

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

Self Cite

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“…Related, a recent survey of formal specification and verification techniques for autonomous robotic systems has revealed that, although there are many tools and techniques available, improvements are still required for their successful deployment in large, complex and autonomous systems (Farrell et al, 2018;Luckcuck et al, 2019). Given modular robot architectures composed of distinct subsystems, different types of verification can potentially be used for different components, as described in (Farrell et al, 2019b;Cardoso et al, 2020a;Cardoso et al, 2020b), as some verification techniques may be more appropriate than others for certain subsystems. Our work also uses multiple distinct verification techniques (Dafny and ROSMonitoring) to verify different components/aspects of the system.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Formal Modelling and Runtime Verification of Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal

et al. 2022

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Active debris removal in space has become a necessary activity to maintain and facilitate orbital operations. Current approaches tend to adopt autonomous robotic systems which are often furnished with a robotic arm to safely capture debris by identifying a suitable grasping point. These systems are controlled by mission-critical software, where a software failure can lead to mission failure which is difficult to recover from since the robotic systems are not easily accessible to humans. Therefore, verifying that these autonomous robotic systems function correctly is crucial. Formal verification methods enable us to analyse the software that is controlling these systems and to provide a proof of correctness that the software obeys its requirements. However, robotic systems tend not to be developed with verification in mind from the outset, which can often complicate the verification of the final algorithms and systems. In this paper, we describe the process that we used to verify a pre-existing system for autonomous grasping which is to be used for active debris removal in space. In particular, we formalise the requirements for this system using the Formal Requirements Elicitation Tool (FRET). We formally model specific software components of the system and formally verify that they adhere to their corresponding requirements using the Dafny program verifier. From the original FRET requirements, we synthesise runtime monitors using ROSMonitoring and show how these can provide runtime assurances for the system. We also describe our experimentation and analysis of the testbed and the associated simulation. We provide a detailed discussion of our approach and describe how the modularity of this particular autonomous system simplified the usually complex task of verifying a system post-development.

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“…This approach also pairs well with Corroborative V&V [3], described in Section 4.6. EXAMPLE: Consider the simplified planetary rover case study in [84], where the rover autonomously inspects points of interest in its map. This inspection is the rover's main task, but it also has to adapt its plan to accommodate adverse environmental conditions.…”

Section: Heterogeneous Verificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These were then used for further analysis in the other verification techniques, for example to refine the formal verification model and improve the simulator. EXAMPLE: Consider further the simplified planetary rover case study described in Section 4.5 from [84] where a rover autonomously visits particular waypoints to make inspections. The decision making aspects could be verified using different verification techniques such as model checking the autonomous agent, simulation based testing and physical experiments.…”

Section: Corroborative Vandvmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Overview of Verification and Validation Challenges for Inspection Robots

et al. 2021

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The advent of sophisticated robotics and AI technology makes sending humans into hazardous and distant environments to carry out inspections increasingly avoidable. Being able to send a robot, rather than a human, into a nuclear facility or deep space is very appealing. However, building these robotic systems is just the start and we still need to carry out a range of verification and validation tasks to ensure that the systems to be deployed are as safe and reliable as possible. Based on our experience across three research and innovation hubs within the UK’s “Robots for a Safer World” programme, we present an overview of the relevant techniques and challenges in this area. As the hubs are active across nuclear, offshore, and space environments, this gives a breadth of issues common to many inspection robots.

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Heterogeneous Verification of an Autonomous Curiosity Rover

Cited by 31 publications

References 7 publications

Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study

Integrating Formal Verification and Assurance: An Inspection Rover Case Study

Formal Modelling and Runtime Verification of Autonomous Grasping for Active Debris Removal

An Overview of Verification and Validation Challenges for Inspection Robots

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