Help and Factionalism in Politics and Organizations

Abstract

Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank-order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial primary elections.

Why lot? How sortition could help representative democracy

“…3 As any other tyranny, the tyrannie de la majorité, which De Tocqueville (1850) cautioned against, may be considered as a case of factionalism. 4 Chan and Man (2012) point to a number of incentives underlying factionalism that can facilitate its inception. 5 Eguia (2011) identifies some incentives to make party discipline effective.…”