Heidegger’s appropriation of Aristotle: Phronesis, conscience, and seeing through the one

Abstract

This article attempts to show that Heidegger's phenomenology may shed light on political phenomena. It pursues this project by arguing that Heidegger's phenomenology is an appropriation of Aristotle's practical philosophy and his conceptualization of phronesis. I argue that, in Being and Time, Heidegger's 'circumspection', which is a capacity for making sense of practical situations, is a translation of phronesis. Heidegger argues, though, that the sight of circumspection is foreshortened by the rules and norms of 'the one'. In division 2, 'conscience' becomes a sharpening of the vision of phronesis, which sees through the one. I then defend Heidegger's appropriation of phronesis and argue that Heidegger's concept of conscience, which takes up a critical stance toward plurality, may actually be a proper vision of practical wisdom under modern conditions. I substantiate this claim by turning to an unlikely source to bolster Heidegger's reading of phronesis and the modern public, Hannah Arendt.

Heidegger on Aristotelian phronêsis and moral justification

“…Matthew Wiedenfeld's (2011) reading of Heidegger's Sophist lectures may provide an alternative way of characterizing variations in moral knowledge, by moderating between Vogel and Young's privileging of authenticity, on the one hand, and McMullin's sense of the aprioricity and ubiquity of moral knowledge, on the other. Wiedenfeld claims that phronêsis in the Sophist lectures appears to be both the correct way to imagine Heidegger's general account of the structure of any moral knowledge at all (as non‐cognitive seeing of the good rather than rationalistic understanding of it), and also an “achievement state” in which one has superior moral knowledge.…”

On Technology and the Prospects for Good Practice in the Human Services: Donald Schön, Martin Heidegger, and the Case forPhronesisandPraxis

“…Heidegger was deeply engaged with Aristotle prior to the publication of Being and Time (e.g., see Heidegger [1922Heidegger [ /1923Heidegger [ ] 2007Heidegger [ , [1924Heidegger [ /1925Heidegger [ ] 2003Heidegger [ , [1924Heidegger [ ] 2009Heidegger [ , 1962. Many authors make the case that Aristotle's ethics and Aristotle's concept of phronesis are central to Heidegger's ontology (e.g., Sheehan 1975;Volpi 1992;Kisiel 1993;Coltman 1998;Weidenfeld 2011;Thanassas 2012). For example, according to Robert Bernasconi (1989), Heidegger has four equivalent ideas to Aristotle's phronesis-circumspection, understanding, resoluteness, and conscience.…”

Can an expanded interpretation of phronesis support teacher professional development for inclusion?

“…However, it should be noted that the social nature of phronesis was not explicitly addressed by Aristotle. This was a task undertaken by Heidegger (1926Heidegger ( / 2005 in Being and Time, a text which Weidenfeld (2011) has suggested may provide the broader conceptual resources needed to understand fully Aristotelian insights into phronesis and political practice under modern conditions.…”

“…Of particular relevance to our work is Heidegger's idea that one's understanding and interpretation of experience does not involve merely cognitive processes, but one's whole being. The contribution of Aristotle's thinking to Heidegger's work has been emphasised by Weidenfeld (2011), who argues that Heidegger's phenomenology is an appropriation of Aristotle's practical philosophy and his conceptualisation of phronesis. However, Heidegger also expanded the conceptual web of phronesis through an analysis of what he calls circumspection and conscience.…”

“…In the second division of Being and Time, Heidegger introduces the notion of conscience which is understood as 'radicalized circumspection' (Weidenfeld, 2011). Here conscience is a form of self-awareness or self-understanding that works in tandem with circumspection to enable one to take a critical stance in relation to social norms and/or the status quo.…”