Hegel’s Epistemological Realism

Westphal, Kenneth R.

doi:10.1007/978-94-009-2342-3

Cited by 147 publications

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“…25See below, §10, and Westphal (1989), 160–83; (2009c). Especially at this point the analysis developed here depends upon a broader interpretation of the 1807 Phenomenology which cannot be defended here, though much of it is defended in Harris (1997) and Westphal, ed., (2009a).…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…27Wildt (1982); Westphal (1989), 160–8, 183; Harris (1997); Siep (1998); Williams (2003a, 2003b); Houlgate (2003); Westphal (2003a), §13.9–11. Siep’s is by far the best concise discussion of Hegel’s account of mutual recognition.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…36It suffices for present purposes to understand Hegel’s intention to defend the conclusion to Kant’s “Refutation of Idealism”; the details of his justification of this thesis need not be considered here. For discussion, see Westphal (1989), 156–64, (2009b), (2009c). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit

Westphal

2009

Dialogue

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Individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification in cognition or morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. I argue for this by defending key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including the “autonomy” of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of “mutual recognition.” These themes are rooted in Kant’s and Hegel’s transformation of the modern natural law tradition, which originates the properly pragmatic account of rationality, which affords genuine rational justification, and which provides for realism about the objects of empirical knowledge and strict objectivity about moral norms.

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit

Westphal

2009

Dialogue

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“…81 For detailed proof, see Westphal (1989), 64-7. Carus (2010 neglects these problems, in part because his study focusses on Carnap's work prior to ESO (1950), though in the concluding sections he over-extends the reach of his analysis by claiming there are no such problems.…”

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Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars

Westphal

2015

JHAP

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This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism is untenable. The tension in Carnap’s semantics together with Quine’s exposure of the severe limits of radical empiricism illuminate central features of Sellars’s philosophy: the fully general form of the myth of givenness, together with Sellars’s alternative Kantian characterisation of understanding; the full significance of Carnap’s distinction between conceptual analysis and conceptual explication, and its important methodological implications; the specifically pragmatic character of Sellars’s realism; and Sellars’s methodological reasons for holding that philosophy must be systematic and that systematic philosophy must be deeply historically and textually informed. This paper thus re-examines this recent episode of philosophical history for its philosophical benefits and systematic insights.

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“…These ideas developed in German philosophy from Kant to Hegel. 16 Accounts of Hegel that oppose the traditional view, and so defend a realist interpretation, can be found in Westphal 1989, Wartenberg 1993and Stern 1990 cf. Hegel 1991: §163, Addition, p. 241: We must add a remark about the explanation of the origin and formation of concepts that is usually given in the logic of the understanding.…”

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Going Beyond the Kantian Philosophy: On McDowell's Hegelian Critique of Kant

Stern¹

1999

European J of Philosophy

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IThe Kant-Hegel relation has a continuing fascination for commentators on Hegel, and understandably so: for, taking this route into the Hegelian jungle can promise many advantages. First, it can set Hegel's thought against a background with which we are fairly familiar, and in a way that makes its relevance clearly apparent; second, it can help us locate Hegel in the broader philosophical tradition, making us see that the traditional 'analytic' jump from Kant to Frege leaves out a crucial period in post-Kantian thought; third, it can show Hegel in a progressive light, as attempting to take that tradition further forward; fourth, it can help us locate familiar philosophical issues in Hegelian thought that otherwise can appear wholly sui generis; and finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, focusing on this relation can help raise and crystalise some of the fascinating ambiguities concerning Hegel's outlook, regarding whether Hegel's response to Kant shows him to have been a reactionary, Romantic, pre-critical thinker, who sought to turn the philosophical clock back to a time before Kant had written, or a modernist, Enlightened and essentially critical one, who remained true to the spirit if not the letter of Kant's philosophy.This strategy of assessing Hegel via his relation to Kant has long been used in connection with his ethics and social thought; and it has more recently been used to good effect in connection with his epistemology and idealist metaphysics. The current consensus in both cases seems to be that it is misguided to set Hegel too rigidly against Kant in these areas, and that instead Hegel should be seen as a figure who seeks to overcome what is problematic in the Kantian project, but nonetheless who aims to take it further forward, to 'go beyond it', as Hegel himself put it. 1 Thus, in ethics and social philosophy, Hegel is no longer seen as the reactionary and conservative defender of Sittlichkeit in opposition to Kant's liberal ideal of Moralität, but as simply trying to complement the abstract universalism of the latter with a more socially situated and historically realistic conception of the subject; whilst in epistemology and metaphysics Hegel is no longer seen as impervious to Kant's modernising project, but rather as trying to save that project from certain debilitating aporiai, in a way that will make it safe against sceptical objections. Thus, on this approach, Hegel's importance, and to some degree that of his contemporaries, lies in the fact that they attempted to overcome a certain one-sidedness in Kant's thought which they believed meant that he

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Hegel’s Epistemological Realism

Cited by 147 publications

References 0 publications

Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit

Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’sPhenomenology of Spirit

Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars

Going Beyond the Kantian Philosophy: On McDowell's Hegelian Critique of Kant

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