Hearing a statement now and believing the opposite later

Garcia‐Marques, Teresa; Silva, Rita R.; Reber, Rolf; Unkelbach, Christian

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2014.09.015

Cited by 48 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…were used. The statements, half true and half false, were gathered from a previous pre-test (see Garcia-Marques, Silva, Reber, & Unkelbach, 2015), Forty-eight of the neutral statements were randomly selected to be the repeated statements (i.e., presented both in the exposure and in the test phase), and other 48 as the new statements in the truth ratings task (i.e., the test phase). The remaining 16 statements were used as new items in the recognition task of the "recognition sequential to truth" condition.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asking simultaneously about truth and familiarity may disrupt truth effects

Garcia‐Marques

Silva

Mello

2017

Análise Psicológica

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Asking simultaneously about truth and familiarity may disrupt truth effects

Garcia‐Marques

Silva

Mello

2017

Análise Psicológica

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“…However, the problem is alleviated by three observations: First, the positive effect of testing on learning FLUENCY IN EDUCATION 29 is greater than the negative effect of endorsing incorrect response options, as shown by Roediger and Marsh (2005). Second, Garcia-Marques, Silva, Reber, & Unkelbach (2015) reported that after a delay of one week (and presumably more), learners are more likely to believe the opposite of what they have heard or read before than statements they have never encountered. Their observations allow for the intriguing speculation that if learners later hear a statement that corresponds to the correct alternative of a multiple choice question, they may believe it even more after having read the lures.…”

Section: Fluency In Education 28mentioning

confidence: 99%

Processing Fluency in Education: How Metacognitive Feelings Shape Learning, Belief Formation, and Affect

Reber

Greifeneder

2016

Educational Psychologist

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Processing fluency-the experienced ease with which a mental operation is performed-has attracted little attention in educational psychology, despite its relevance. The present article reviews and integrates empirical evidence on processing fluency that is relevant to school education. Fluency is important, for instance, in learning, self-assessment of knowledge, testing, grading, teacher-student communication, social interaction in the multicultural classroom, and emergence of interest. After a brief overview of basic fluency research we review effects of processing fluency in three broad areas, namely metacognition in learning, belief formation, and affect. Within each area, we provide evidence-based implications for education. Along the way, we offer fluency-based insights into phenomena that were long known but not yet sufficiently explained (e.g., the effect of handwriting on grading). Bringing fluency (back) to education may contribute to research and school practice alike. FLUENCY IN EDUCATION 3 In the last decades, school education systems in many countries have been inspired by central tenets of cognitive psychology. The symbolic mental processes examined by cognitive psychologists are often implicit to the way teaching and learning at school is conceptualized. An important branch of cognitive research deals with metacognition, that is, cognition about cognition, such as knowledge about cognitive processes, or strategies to monitor or control cognitive performance (Flavell, 1979). Metacognition further encompasses subjective experiences or feelings that arise when a mental operation is performed. Such metacognitive feelings include, for instance, feelings of knowing, feelings of familiarity, feelings of rightness, or feelings of coherence, that all depend on processing fluency (or just fluency; e.g.,

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“…to understand the interplay between the two systems' processing features on the truth effect itself (and not memory's role in it), it is preferable to use manipulations that only distinguish between system 1 and system 2 at the moment when truth judgments are made. few experiments have done this, and those that have only did so indirectly, either by including older adults in the samples (e.g., skurnik, yoon, park, & schwarz, 2005) or delaying the interval between the familiarization and truth evaluation phases (e.g., bacon, 1979;brown & nix, 1996;garcia-marques, silva, Reber, & Unkelbach, 2015;hasher et al, 1977;hawkins & hoch, 1992;skurnik et al, 2005). these studies also showed that illusions of truth are not dependent on explicit memory because delaying the truth evaluation up to a month (e.g., brown & nix, 1996) did not eliminate the effect; in some cases, it even boosted it (e.g., hawkins & hoch, 1992).…”

Section: The Dual-process Account Of the Illusion Of Truth Effectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Judging the Truth-Value of a Statement In and Out of a Deep Processing Context

Garcia‐Marques¹,

Silva²,

Mello³

2016

Social Cognition

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Individuals judge fluently processed statements truer than disfluent statements, which reflects an illusion of truth. A dual-processing approach to the truth effect suggests that cognitive resources and motivation for accuracy should moderate this effect. however, previous research has only manipulated participants' capacity during the encoding of the statements. We directly test an account of the truth effect based on processing features of system 1, manipulating both capacity and motivation at the time of the truth judgments. fluency was manipulated either through repetition (Experiment 1) or perceptual contrast (Experiment 2). Congruent with dualistic assumptions, the evaluations of participants in the high-capacity and highmotivation conditions differed from those of participants in the other three conditions. however, the pattern of the truth effect in that specific condition was not the same in both experiments: in Experiment 1, the illusion of truth was only reduced, whereas the effect was completely reversed in Experiment 2.

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Hearing a statement now and believing the opposite later

Cited by 48 publications

References 20 publications

Asking simultaneously about truth and familiarity may disrupt truth effects

Asking simultaneously about truth and familiarity may disrupt truth effects

Processing Fluency in Education: How Metacognitive Feelings Shape Learning, Belief Formation, and Affect

Judging the Truth-Value of a Statement In and Out of a Deep Processing Context

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