Heads I win, tails it's chance: The illusion of control as a function of the sequence of outcomes in a purely chance task.

Abstract

Attributions in a purely chance task (predicting coin tosses) were studied as a function of either a descending, ascending, or random sequence of outcomes and as a function of whether the subject performed the task himself or observed another subject performing the task. A primary effect was predicted, that is, that early successes would induce a skill orientation towards the task. The prediction was supported. Subjects in the descending condition rated themselves as significantly better at predicting the outcomes of coin tosses than subjects in either of the other two groups. This group also overremembered past successes and expected more future successes than the other two groupSt_Inyolyement had the effect of increasing subjects' expectations of future successes and tended to increase their evaluation of their past performance.

Reconciling reinforcement learning models with behavioral extinction and renewal: Implications for addiction, relapse, and problem gambling.

“…The identification of losses with a new state sЈ that must be differentiated from an original state s may potentially explain the effect of "hindsight bias" (Custer, 1984;Langer & Roth, 1975;Wagenaar, 1988), in which gamblers analyze their losses and explain them away by noting what went wrong and why they should have known they would lose. Similarly, this theory explains the "illusion of control," in which gamblers believe they can control statistical situations (Custer, 1984;Elster, 1999;Wagenaar, 1988), as a misclassification of a single statistical situation into multiple differentiable situations (i.e., as a problem with the situation-categorization component).…”

Project managers’ overconfidence: how is risk reflected in anticipated project success?

“…Anticipation of success is prone to biases linked to the desirability of the outcome (Seybert and Bloomfield 2009;Vosgerau 2010;Windschitl et al 2010) or to perceived but non-existent control over the outcome (Goodman and Irwin 2006;Langer and Roth 1975). At the same time, information supporting desirable outcomes is perceived to be more credible than information supporting undesirable outcomes (Barber et al 2009;Gordon et al 2005).…”

Changing the world and changing the self: A two-process model of perceived control.

“…Unfortunately, the research does not make it possible to differentiate the extent to which subjects are seeking meaning per se (which we regard as a type of control) from the extent to which they are seeking the positive thoughts and positive mood that often accompany the achievement of meaning. Some authors, especially Bulman and Wortman (1977) and Langer et al (1975), emphasize the former; others, especially Lazarus and Launier (1978), emphasize the latter. In the light of Lazarus and Launier's emphasis, it is ironic that they provided some of the most eloquent descriptions of secondary control dynamics.…”