Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995

Krause, Volker

doi:10.1080/03050620490884038

Cited by 17 publications

(14 citation statements)

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“…Craft and Smaldone (2002) find that arms transfers have been a strong predictor of states’ armed conflict involvement in sub‐Saharan Africa (693). Research by Krause (2004) suggests that “absent status quo acceptance, increased arms transfers from major powers make states more likely to be initiators and targets of militarized disputes” (367).…”

Section: Previous Literature On Arms and Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation

Sullivan¹,

Tessman²,

2011

Foreign Policy Analysis

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What can states expect to receive in return for the military aid they provide to other states? Can military aid buy recipient state compliance with donor objectives? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of US military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We build on existing literature by creating three explicit theoretical models, employing a new measure of cooperation generated from events data, and controlling for preference similarity, so that our results capture the influence military aid has on recipient state behavior independent of any dyadic predisposition toward cooperation or conflict. We test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find that, with limited exceptions, increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. US reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; instead of using a carrot-and-stick approach to military aid allocations, our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance.

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Section: Previous Literature On Arms and Influencementioning

confidence: 99%

US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation

Sullivan¹,

Tessman²,

2011

Foreign Policy Analysis

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“…The result suggests that the capability of allies matters more than the simple presence of alliances in the decision of dispute initiation for states, and that states are more emboldened to initiate a dispute rather than being constrained when they have a strong ally. This result demonstrates the opposite empirical pattern to the arguments for the restraining effect of powerful allies on states' conflict behavior (Beckley, 2015;Krause, 2004;Pressman, 2008). 19 On the contrary, this encouraging effect confirms Palmer and Morgan's finding (2006) while this result shows a more comprehensive increasing effect of the capability of allies.…”

Section: Findings and Discussionmentioning

confidence: 61%

Capability revisited: Ally’s capability and dispute initiation

Kang

2015

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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The main questions explored here are whether alliances lead to conflict between member states and non-member states and whether the capability of allies is a source of this effect. Building on the opportunity framework, this study argues that, with more confidence in military success due to support from allies, challenger states are more likely to be emboldened and to initiate disputes. The empirical analyses show that the capability of allies has an increasing effect on dispute initiation of member states against non-member states. This increasing effect becomes stronger as the level of common interests between the allies increases. The test results consistently suggest that alliances embolden member states to initiate disputes against non-member states, and also that alliances are more likely to aggravate, but not mute, dispute initiation against member states.

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“…The existing literature on the statistical relationship between (conventional) arms transfers and conflict provides mixed empirical results Smaldone, 2002, 2003;Suzuki, 2007), and scholars note a disconnect between the theory driving these studies and the literature on war and bargaining (Krause, 2004).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Arms Diffusion and War

Bas

Coe

2012

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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We present a model of the relationship between the spread of new military technologies and the occurrence of war. A new technology could shift the balance of power, causing anticipatory war as one side tries to prevent the other from obtaining it. When one side already has it, war is more likely when the shift in power is large, likely, and durable. When neither side has it, war is more likely when the expected shift is asymmetric (e.g., one side is more likely to get it) and when the two sides fear that a war will occur once one of them has it. We illustrate the model with historical examples from the spread of firearms (the Musket Wars in pre-colonial New Zealand) and of nuclear weapons (the end of US nuclear monopoly, and the 1967 Six-Day War). A broader implication is that major power competition can unintentionally cause wars elsewhere. * Comments are welcome and should be sent to mbas@gov.harvard.edu and acoe@fas.harvard.edu. We are grateful to

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Hazardous Weapons? Effects of Arms Transfers and Defense Pacts on Militarized Disputes, 1950-1995

Cited by 17 publications

References 0 publications

US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation

US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation

Capability revisited: Ally’s capability and dispute initiation

Arms Diffusion and War

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