Have Korea and Japan Reconciled? A Focus on the Three Stages of Reconciliation

Abstract

Previous studies on international reconciliation have focused on the security and economic interests of the countries involved, treating reconciliation as an end-goal rather than an ongoing process. This study divides the process of reconciliation into three stages. ‘Procedural reconciliation’, which refers to the mending of international relations through institutional change, is the most basic. In the ‘material reconciliation’ phase, the perpetrator(s) provides the victim(s) – either at the individual or state level – with economic compensation for inflicting harm. The third stage, ‘ideational reconciliation’, is reached when the perpetrator acknowledges past wrongdoings and when civil and cultural exchanges are carried out smoothly.This study delves into the relations between South Korea and Japan. Even though reconciliation between South Korea and Japan is vital to achieve stable peace in Northeast Asia, the topic has not received sufficient scholarly attention. Former studies have focused on bilateral relations, but few have discussed the two countries' path towards reconciliation. In this study, readers will find an in-depth analysis of the ties between South Korea and Japan from an international reconciliation perspective, one which will help them understand how the two nations have worked towards understanding and how much they have achieved to date. The study also suggests a roadmap to reach the final stage of reconciliation and identifies the policy changes needed to get there.

Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash

“…He ‘chose a different path for Korea, seeking the economic benefits derived from diplomatic relations with Japan despite widespread domestic opposition’ from doing business with the recent colonisers and initiated the cold politics, hot economics dynamic (Jackson, 2011, p. 240). The social and political relationship that has been slowly reconstructed following normalisation in 1965 visibly sours when historical disagreements some to the forefront (Chun, 2015; Gries, Zhang, Masui, & Lee, 2009; Kagotani, Kimura, & Weber, 2014; Kim, 2014; Koga K., 2016). However, similar to Reform and Opening Era China, even when political relations with Japan sour, economic relations continue to expand (Park, 2011).…”

“…Following political disputes with Japan, there are occasional calls to boycott Japanese products, although it is not the most popular form of protest. The most common protests against Japan are the comfort women sit-ins in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, which aim at receiving financial reparations or an official statement admitting wrongdoing by the Japanese military regime (Chun, 2015). Calls from Korean activists for boycotts of Japanese products are less consistent.…”

“…The two countries have long seemed ‘ripe for cooperation’ but have failed to deepen security cooperation to the extent purely material considerations would suggest possible (Cha, 2000, p. 309). While shared security and material interests have likely prevented an escalation of conflict, ordinary Koreans and political elites have not shied from political protest or demonstration against Japan, with perhaps the most visible example of the weekly ‘comfort women’ protests in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul, and have not found reconciliation (see Chun, 2015). It is not a protest as such but a protest in the form of business–politics linkage that rarely occurs.…”

Shutting Down the Kaesong Industrial Complex: A “Coalitional Bargaining” Framework

“…In this light, the state of ROK‐Japan security relationship, or lack thereof, questions the validity of balance of threat theories that explain the level of security cooperation between nations as a function of the level of external threat (Cha, , p. 261). Due to historical animosity and the ongoing disputes over the legacy of Japan’s colonization of Korea, an undercurrent of anxiety resurfaces with the discussion of higher security cooperation, making the relationship unpredictable and volatile (Chun, ; Park, ; Yoon, ). Such frictions complicate the U.S.‐ROK‐Japan trilateral cooperation, even though the three nations share common interests in trade, economic development, peacekeeping, and international norms (Choi, ; Hinata‐Yamaguchi, ; Kennedy, ).…”

Irreparable Animosity? Centripetal versus Centrifugal Force in South Korea-Japan Mutual Perceptions, 1998-2015

“…As many scholars note, reconciliation between former adversary states contains both government-to-government and people-to-people dimensions (He 2009;Feldman 2012;Chun 2015). The intergovernmental dimension includes diplomatic normalization, stable peace, the issuance of apologetic statements, the provision of official reparations or compensations, and comprehensive and smooth economic interactions.…”