How do we learn to be good? Aristotle's answer will be familiar to any student of Greek philosophy: we become good-or virtuous-by doing virtuous actions. But how does the practice of virtuous actions give rise to virtuous dispositions, and, in particular, the disposition to choose virtuous actions as the virtuous person does -that is, for the sake of the noble (kalon)?These questions have long occupied readers of Aristotle's ethics and offer the starting point for Marta Jimenez' excellent monograph Aristotle on Shame and Learning to be Good. Jimenez is particularly concerned with the question 'what are the conditions that make learners ready to receive the virtues and allow them to succeed in becoming good?' (p.>T) and her answer-as indicated by her title-is that the presence of shame (aidōs, aischunē) is essential for ensuring that a learner acts in a way that is conducive to virtue. This book, then, can be seen as much as an attempt to rehabilitate shame as a positive emotion as it is to elucidate Aristotelian moral development. In fact, the primacy of Jimenez' interest in shame is evident from her Introduction, which highlights the complex nature of shame and helpfully situates her interpretation of Aristotle's account amongst contemporary treatments, both positive and negative. Against those who have expressed scepticism about a role for shame in moral theory and wariness of the dangers associated with 'shame culture', Jimenez argues that those features that have aroused suspicion-shame's responsiveness to the views of others and to praise and blame-make it a perfect catalyst for moral development. According to Jimenez, shame is linked to 'a concern with being seen as noble and expressing nobility (or avoiding shamefulness) in one's actions because one aspires to genuine nobility and goodness' (p.>>) and thus directs the attention of learners towards considerations of nobility when they act. This is a philosophically rich book and I found Jimenez' analysis of shame and her embracing of its complex nature particularly illuminating; indeed, I am persuaded that shame ought to be seen as a positive force within Aristotle's account of moral development. My more critical comments are reserved for (aspects of) her approach to Aristotelian habituation, though these should not be taken as a reflection on the merit of the project, or to detract from its many other virtues. I will begin, then, by tracing the argument of the book through a summary of its chapters, before reflecting on the assumptions that underpin Jimenez' investigation.
>. The problem of continuityJimenez' analysis begins with a puzzle posed by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics :.? and directed at what she calls the learning-by-doing thesis -the thesis that we become virtuous by doing virtuous actions. As Jimenez reads the puzzle, and as it has traditionally been read, Aristotle asks how a learner can perform virtuous actions unless she is already virtuous, given the assumption that the possession of virtue is a requirement for virtuous action (the 'prior...
