“…35 Perry (2003) disagrees. Harman (2009) agrees. Note that the fact that every historical worsening is a harm implies the falsity of what we might call contextualism about harm, according to which E is a harm for A just in case E is A's deviating for the worse in some respect from the course of events that it would be reasonable for A to expect to undergo, given the circumstances that A happens to occupy.…”
Section: The Historical Viewmentioning
confidence: 65%
“…Epicurus has not been entirely without his recent fans; see Rosenbaum (1986) and Suits (2001). 48 Shiffrin (2012; and Harman (2009) argue that non-comparativism's ability to say that one can be harmed at the first moment of one's existence (since one can be in a bad state at the first moment of one's existence) is a mark in its favor. Unsurprisingly, I think it is a mark in its disfavor.…”
In recent years, philosophers have proposed a variety of accounts of the nature of harm. In this paper, I consider several of these accounts and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then make a modest case for a different view.
“…35 Perry (2003) disagrees. Harman (2009) agrees. Note that the fact that every historical worsening is a harm implies the falsity of what we might call contextualism about harm, according to which E is a harm for A just in case E is A's deviating for the worse in some respect from the course of events that it would be reasonable for A to expect to undergo, given the circumstances that A happens to occupy.…”
Section: The Historical Viewmentioning
confidence: 65%
“…Epicurus has not been entirely without his recent fans; see Rosenbaum (1986) and Suits (2001). 48 Shiffrin (2012; and Harman (2009) argue that non-comparativism's ability to say that one can be harmed at the first moment of one's existence (since one can be in a bad state at the first moment of one's existence) is a mark in its favor. Unsurprisingly, I think it is a mark in its disfavor.…”
In recent years, philosophers have proposed a variety of accounts of the nature of harm. In this paper, I consider several of these accounts and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then make a modest case for a different view.
“…For Harman and Shiffrin, it is direct causation 3 8 9. Hanser argues, using the following case, that it must be more than causation:
Short-sightedness: a doctor performs an operation on a patient to reduce their short-sightedness.
…”
Section: Harm and Harmingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Harman points out that there are two ways in which harming someone is bad 8. These are drawn out by the objection that, on her view, there is no obvious difference between knowingly conceiving a deaf child and (painlessly) deafening an existing child.…”
Section: Harm and Harmingmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A bad state could be …
When the child's experience falls below a certain threshold of normality7When the child's experience is below a minimally decent threshold5When there is a chasm between the person's will and their experience3Premature death, disability, disfigurement or damage8 9A state one would have a strong rational preference not to be in 10…”
Section: Approaches To Procreative Responsibilitymentioning
Reproductive decision-making in the post-genetic age is a minefield of complex ethical problems. One such problem centres on whether there is an obligation on reproducers to choose the best possible child. This paper focusses on a simplified scenario: there are two embryos to choose from, one of which will develop a condition that diminishes quality of life but would still have 'a life worth living', the other of which is normal. Is there an obligation to choose the healthier child? If so, what is the nature and scope of this obligation? The answer to these questions relies on a satisfactory answer to the non-identity problem (NIP). This paper explores several solutions to the NIP and argues for a solution grounded in the concept of harm. Various accounts of harm are discussed and synthesised to provide a new 'comparative bad state view' of harm. This account is used to justify the obligation to choose the healthier child. How far should this obligation go? This paper rejects the conservative position of 'procreative autonomy' - which holds that such obligations have no place in reproductive decisions - and the radical position of 'procreative beneficence' - which holds that there is an even stronger obligation to make the best possible child. The obligation to choose the healthier child may be over-ridden by countervailing reasons; the moral calculus in any individual case will be largely dependent on the expected quality of life of the child.
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.