Harman’s Equation and Non-Basic Intrinsic Value

Danielsson, Sven

doi:10.1007/1-4020-3846-1_30

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…While these definitions are standard, they are not unchallenged. See, for example, Danielsson (, pp. 18–19).…”

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confidence: 99%

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Gustafsson

2015

Nous

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Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.There are two main approaches to defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. One is the negation approach put forward by Albert P. Brogan. On this approach, a monadic value condition of a state of affairs is defined in terms of dyadic value relations between the state and its negation. For example, Brogan defines 'intrinsically good' as (1) p is intrinsically good = df p is intrinsically better than the negation of p. 1This approach, however, rules out some reasonable axiologies. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa's example is a version of hedonism where the state of affairs there being no unhappy egrets is not intrinsically good but still intrinsically better than its negation.2 (1) rules out this version of hedonism, which, being a fairly reasonable axiology, should not be ruled out by conceptual fiat.The other approach is the indifference-point approach, favoured by Chisholm and Sosa. It has two steps. First, one defines an indifference point in terms of dyadic value relations, or at least not in terms of monadic value predicates.3 Second, one defines a monadic value condition of a thing in terms of dyadic value relations between the thing and the indifference point. For example, Chisholm and Sosa define an indifference point as follows:(2) p is intrinsically indifferent = df p is not intrinsically better than the negation of p and the negation of p is not intrinsically better than p. Then, given (2), they define 'intrinsically good' as (3) p is intrinsically good = df there is a q such that q is intrinsically indifferent and p is intrinsically better than q.

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“…While these definitions are standard, they are not unchallenged. See, for example, Danielsson (, pp. 18–19).…”

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confidence: 99%

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Gustafsson

2015

Nous

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“…If the items are states of affairs and the concatenation operation is conjunction, one state can be considered a perfect copy of another if the two states contain the same number and types of "basic" value states. See Danielsson 1997;Zimmerman 2001. 16 In Carlson 2006, I show that incomparability is compatible with a form ofextensive rneasurement.…”

Section: Extensive Structures and The Archimedean Axiommentioning

confidence: 99%

“…16 In Carlson 2006, I show that incomparability is compatible with a form ofextensive rneasurement. 17 For proposals of how to reconcile (A3) with organic unities, see Danielsson, 1997, p.32f:, Zirnrnerman, 2001 It should be pointed out, though, that a possible phenomenon akin to that of higher values is ruled out by the conjunction of ( A l ) and (A3). For some pair of items a and b, it may be the case that mbRna holds for large m and sufficiently small n, but that there is a k E I+, such that, for no m E I+, mhRka.I8 This implies that there are m, n for which mbRna, but not 2mbR2na.…”

Section: Extensive Structures and The Archimedean Axiommentioning

confidence: 99%

Higher Values and Non‐Archimedean Additivity

Carlson

2007

Theoria

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Many philosophers have claimed that extensive or additive measurement is incompatiblewith the existence of “higher values”, any amount of which is better than any amount of some other value. In this paper, it is shown that higher values can be incorporated in a non‐standard model of extensive measurement, with values represented by sets of ordered pairs of real numbers, rather than by single reals. The suggested model is mathematically fairly simple, and it applies to structures including negative as well as positive values.

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“…SeeKrantz et al 2007, chapter 3. 17 But seeDanielsson 1997, for an interesting proposal about how to combine organic unities, violating monotonicity, with additive measurement, within an intrinsicalist framework. MichaelZimmerman (2001) argues that we can deny the existence of organic unities, and preserve monotonicity, while accommodating many of the intuitions that underlie alleged examples of organic unities.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value

Carlson

2019

J Value Inquiry

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Harman’s Equation and Non-Basic Intrinsic Value

Cited by 5 publications

References 5 publications

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Higher Values and Non‐Archimedean Additivity

Organic Unities and Conditionalism About Final Value

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