Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Abstract

Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.There are two main approaches to defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. One is the negation approach put forward by Albert P. Brogan. On this approach, a monadic value condition of a state of affairs is defined in terms of dyadic value relations between the state and its negation. For example, Brogan defines 'intrinsically good' as (1) p is intrinsically good = df p is intrinsically better than the negation of p. 1This approach, however, rules out some reasonable axiologies. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa's example is a version of hedonism where the state of affairs there being no unhappy egrets is not intrinsically good but still intrinsically better than its negation.2 (1) rules out this version of hedonism, which, being a fairly reasonable axiology, should not be ruled out by conceptual fiat.The other approach is the indifference-point approach, favoured by Chisholm and Sosa. It has two steps. First, one defines an indifference point in terms of dyadic value relations, or at least not in terms of monadic value predicates.3 Second, one defines a monadic value condition of a thing in terms of dyadic value relations between the thing and the indifference point. For example, Chisholm and Sosa define an indifference point as follows:(2) p is intrinsically indifferent = df p is not intrinsically better than the negation of p and the negation of p is not intrinsically better than p. Then, given (2), they define 'intrinsically good' as (3) p is intrinsically good = df there is a q such that q is intrinsically indifferent and p is intrinsically better than q.

Person-Affecting and Non-Identity

“…A state of affairs is exemplified just in case the actual concrete world is a member of p (i.e., the set of all the p-worlds). A state of affairs p is exemplified by a concrete possible world w just in case w is a member of p. 28 Examples of other kinds of the value would be the indeterminate values of disjunctions that consist of disjuncts with different absolute values (e.g., being happy or being unhappy, being happy or being indifferent), and what Gustafsson (2016) a particular, if it is a property; a truth-maker, if it is a proposition; and a realization of a state of affairs, if it is a state of affairs, where the realization in turn consists of 'states' i.e., properties and relations, and parts of the world (events, processes, particulars, or individuals) that exemplify these states.…”

Value relations sans evaluative grounds

“…After all, value relations cannot be grounded in individual values if there are no individual values for them to be grounded in, nor does it seem plausible to suggest that all value relations have to be grounded in other value relations. For an excellent discussion, seeGustafsson (2014Gustafsson ( , 2016.…”

“…In other words, the reductive view removes the need for the reversed evaluative view. Again, for objections, seeGustafsson (2014Gustafsson ( , 2016.…”