Hardware trojans in 3-D ICs due to NBTI effects and countermeasure

Mossa, Siraj Fulum; Hasan, Syed Rafay; Elkeelany, Omar

doi:10.1016/j.vlsi.2017.03.009

Cited by 16 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…As the heating element is enabled, and it approaches the primary thermal point (T p1 −60 • C), operation mode 2 (01) is enforced. In this mode, the fixed sensor segment (FSS) remains dormant (0), whereas the dynamic sensor segment (DSS) assumes the threshold voltage-aware mode (1). Every inverter in DSS is now subjected to dc stress (induced by gradual shifts in threshold voltage) by pulling its input to the ground.…”

Section: A Threshold Voltage Based Sensor Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

et al. 2020

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The ageing phenomenon of negative bias temperature instability (NBTI) continues to challenge the dynamic thermal management of modern FPGAs. Increased transistor density leads to thermal accumulation and propagates higher and non-uniform temperature variations across the FPGA. This aggravates the impact of NBTI on key PMOS transistor parameters such as threshold voltage and drain current. Where it ages the transistors, with a successive reduction in FPGA lifetime and reliability, it also challenges its security. The ingress of threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan, a stealthy and malicious electronic circuit, in the modern FPGA, is one such potential threat that could exploit NBTI and severely affect its performance. The development of an effective and efficient countermeasure against it is, therefore, highly critical. Accordingly, we present a comprehensive FPGA security scheme, comprising novel elements of hardware Trojan infection, detection, and mitigation, to protect FPGA applications against the hardware Trojan. Built around the threat model of a naval warship's integrated self-protection system (ISPS), we propose a threshold voltage-triggered hardware Trojan that operates in a threshold voltage region of 0.45V to 0.998V, consuming ultra-low power (10.5nW), and remaining stealthy with an area overhead as low as 1.5% for a 28 nm technology node. The hardware Trojan detection sub-scheme provides a unique lightweight threshold voltage-aware sensor with a detection sensitivity of 0.251mV/nA. With fixed and dynamic ring oscillatorbased sensor segments, the precise measurement of frequency and delay variations in response to shifts in the threshold voltage of a PMOS transistor is also proposed. Finally, the FPGA security scheme is reinforced with an online transistor dynamic scaling (OTDS) to mitigate the impact of hardware Trojan through run-time tolerant circuitry capable of identifying critical gates with worst-case drain current degradation. INDEX TERMS Ageing mechanism, field programmable gate array (FPGA), hardware Trojan, negative bias temperature instability (NBTI), propagation delay, reliability, threshold voltage. I. INTRODUCTION A modern FPGA is not merely an emulator but a hardware accelerator with heterogenous hard IP cores, such as complex memory blocks, multiple processors, and DSP blocks. Systems on chip (SoC), network on chip (NoC), and adaptive compute acceleration platform (ACAP) are the significant performance and functional enhancements of FPGAs, that have been made possible due to the continual shrinking of transistor sizes down to the scales of 10 nm and below. The performance benefits, however, are limited by power The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Luis Javier Garcia Villalba. and timing closures. Similarly, the geometric structures of FPGAs with much less silicon and relatively more oxide and moulding compound complicate the heat conduction paths [1]. On the one hand, where it may deteriorate the worstcase heat dissi...

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Section: A Threshold Voltage Based Sensor Architecturementioning

confidence: 99%

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

et al. 2020

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“…In the current semiconductor business model, more and more chip designs are outsourced for fabrication. As a result, neither all single die fabrication foundries nor vertical interconnect manufacturers are trusted [6,[20][21][22][23]26].…”

Section: Our Survey On Existing Hardware Trojans In 3d Integrated Circuits and Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The unexpected transition glitches can be employed to design Trojan triggers. As indicated in [20,21], thermaltriggered Trojans can be inserted by any malicious foundries with access to the layout of designs. Those Trojans likely congregate near the middle tier, where heat dissipation is harder than in other tiers [21].…”

Section: Thermal-triggered 3d Trojansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

et al. 2020

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Three-dimensional (3D) integration facilitates to integrate an increasing number of transistors into a single package. Despite improved performance and power efficiency, the integration of multiple dies in the same package potentially leads to new security threats, such as 3D hardware Trojans. This work conducts a thorough survey on hardware Trojans reported in 3D integrated circuits (ICs) and systems, and proposes a comprehensive characterization of 3D hardware Trojans. Several case studies are performed to validate the feasibility of 3D hardware Trojan implementation. Our experimental results indicate that 3D ICs indeed provide a better environment for inserting stealthy thermal-based Trojans than 2D ICs. Multiple FPGA boards are utilized to conceptually emulate the stacked 3D ICs that experience multi-tier hardware Trojans. The stealthiness and effectiveness of the proposed multi-tier Trojans are validated in our case studies. The emulation results further show that the existing current-based self-referencing Trojan detection method designed for 2D Trojans will result in a lower detection rate in 3D scenarios. Keywords Three-dimensional integration • Hardware Trojan • Trojan model • Side-channel analysis attack • Interconnect • Power distribution network (PDN) • Network-on-chip (NoC) This article is part of the topical collection "Hardware-Assisted Security Solutions for Electronic Systems" guest edited by

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“…Some articles designed or considered some potential HTs from the attacker’s point of view and put forward solutions to these HTs [ 22 , 23 , 24 , 25 , 26 , 27 , 28 , 29 , 30 , 31 , 32 ]. Some researchers applied HTs to the real environment and designed a scheme to defend it [ 33 , 34 , 35 , 36 , 37 , 38 , 39 , 40 , 41 , 42 , 43 , 44 ]. Individual scholars proposed methods to reduce the effect of the HTs [ 44 , 45 ].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hardware Trojans in Chips: A Survey for Detection and Prevention

Dong

Liu

et al. 2020

Sensors

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Diverse and wide-range applications of integrated circuits (ICs) and the development of Cyber Physical System (CPS), more and more third-party manufacturers are involved in the manufacturing of ICs. Unfortunately, like software, hardware can also be subjected to malicious attacks. Untrusted outsourced manufacturing tools and intellectual property (IP) cores may bring enormous risks from highly integrated. Attributed to this manufacturing model, the malicious circuits (known as Hardware Trojans, HTs) can be implanted during the most designing and manufacturing stages of the ICs, causing a change of functionality, leakage of information, even a denial of services (DoS), and so on. In this paper, a survey of HTs is presented, which shows the threatens of chips, and the state-of-the-art preventing and detecting techniques. Starting from the introduction of HT structures, the recent researches in the academic community about HTs is compiled and comprehensive classification of HTs is proposed. The state-of-the-art HT protection techniques with their advantages and disadvantages are further analyzed. Finally, the development trends in hardware security are highlighted.

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Hardware trojans in 3-D ICs due to NBTI effects and countermeasure

Cited by 16 publications

References 30 publications

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

Ingress of Threshold Voltage-Triggered Hardware Trojan in the Modern FPGA Fabric–Detection Methodology and Mitigation

Comprehensive Analysis on Hardware Trojans in 3D ICs: Characterization and Experimental Impact Assessment

Hardware Trojans in Chips: A Survey for Detection and Prevention

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