Hardware Attacks on Mobile Robots: I2C Clock Attacking

Gómez-Bravo, Fernando; Jiménez-Naharro, Raúl; García, Jonathan Medina; Galán, J.; Sánchez-Raya, M.

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-27146-0_12

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 6 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Several communication protocols represent a potential attack surface. For instance, USB [9], I2C [10], JTAG [11], UART [12], CAN [13] and SPI [14] can be physically accessed from any available pins of the devices without any modification.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

A Low-cost Hardware Attack Detection Solution for IoT Devices

Lorandel

Khelif

Romain

2022

2022 IEEE 31st International Symposium on Industrial Electronics (ISIE)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, it is also simple to disrupt communications within this bus. As presented in [10], the I2C bus attacked using a clock glitching approach. During the attack, the I2C clock line (SCL) is forced to low while communication between a master and a slave peripheral occurs.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Low-cost Hardware Attack Detection Solution for IoT Devices

Lorandel

Khelif

Romain

2022

2022 IEEE 31st International Symposium on Industrial Electronics (ISIE)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…The main attack performed on this bus targets the clock signal which has a critical role in a synchronous protocol such as I2C. These clock glitching attacks [12] affect the system and result in a global malfunction or a denial of service. I2C can also be targeted by attacks that aim to recover the data and firmware stored in an EEPROM [13] [14].…”

Section: Attacks On Communication Busmentioning

confidence: 99%

Non-invasive I2C Hardware Trojan Attack Vector

Khelif

Lorandel

Romain

2021

2021 IEEE International Symposium on Defect and Fault Tolerance in VLSI and Nanotechnology Systems (DFT)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In smartphones, and more generally in IoT devices, manufacturers focus their efforts on securing communications with the outside world that are more exposed to attack while considering communications between secure components. By doing this, it results in internal communication buses with little or no security against attackers. I2C is the most used internal communication bus in IoT devices to communicate with sensors and memories. It is also used in recent smartphones to connect the Trusted Execution Environments (ARM TrustZone, Apple SEP, or Google Titan M) to a dedicated EEPROM memory that contains secret information such as encryption keys, anti-replay counter, or the boot ROM. In this paper, we propose a non-invasive attack through a hardware trojan on the I2C bus, which will allow us to perform two attack scenarios: a heart bleeding type attack which will allow retrieving additional information at each memory read, and a buffer overflow attack which will allow writing additional data in the memory at each write which can result in modifying secret information such as password or counters. These attacks can be performed on any device using the I2C bus. In the context of smartphones, these attacks will allow the extraction of sensitive information stored in the secure EEPROM memory.

show abstract

“…Due to their increasing adoption, robotic systems are becoming an attractive target of malicious attacks [1]. From interruption of services, to falsification and theft of data, increasingly sophisticated methods are being deployed to attack various components of a robotic system [2,3,4]. Hence, security for robotic systems has become an ever-evolving challenge encompassing physical as well as communication and software layers of the architecture.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

RoboMal: Malware Detection for Robot Network Systems

Kaur¹,

Zhou²,

Shen³

et al. 2022

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Robot systems are increasingly integrating into numerous avenues of modern life. From cleaning houses to providing guidance and emotional support, robots now work directly with humans. Due to their far-reaching applications and progressively complex architecture, they are being targeted by adversarial attacks such as sensor-actuator attacks, data spoofing, malware, and network intrusion. Therefore, security for robotic systems has become crucial. In this paper, we address the underserved area of malware detection in robotic software. Since robots work in close proximity to humans, often with direct interactions, malware could have life-threatening impacts. Hence, we propose the RoboMal framework of static malware detection on binary executables to detect malware before it gets a chance to execute. Additionally, we address the great paucity of data in this space by providing the RoboMal dataset 1 comprising controller executables of a small-scale autonomous car. The performance of the framework is compared against widely used supervised learning models: GRU, CNN, and ANN. Notably, the LSTMbased RoboMal model outperforms the other models with an accuracy of 85% and precision of 87% in 10-fold cross-validation, hence proving the effectiveness of the proposed framework.

show abstract

Hardware Attacks on Mobile Robots: I2C Clock Attacking

Cited by 7 publications

References 6 publications

A Low-cost Hardware Attack Detection Solution for IoT Devices

A Low-cost Hardware Attack Detection Solution for IoT Devices

Non-invasive I2C Hardware Trojan Attack Vector

RoboMal: Malware Detection for Robot Network Systems

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About