Happiness, Well‐being, and Their Relation to Virtue in Descartes' Ethics*

Abstract

My main thesis in this article is that Descartes' ethics should be understood as involving a distinction between happiness and well-being. The distinction I have in mind is never clearly stated or articulated by Descartes himself, but I argue that we nevertheless have good reason to embrace it as an important component in a charitable reconstruction of his ethical thought. In section I, I present Descartes' account of happiness and of how he thinks happiness can (and cannot) be acquired. Then, in section II, I introduce and develop the distinction between happiness and well-being. I do this via a discussion of a difficult passage in one of Descartes' letters to Elisabeth, where he may seem first to grant and then immediately to reject the view that people's happiness can vary in degree depending on the possession of goods or perfections that are outside their power to control. I believe my proposed distinction can help us make good sense of this passage. In the last two sections (III and IV), I then offer some further grounds or reasons for why the proposed distinction should be ascribed to Descartes.

Joy and happiness: a simultaneous and evolutionary concept analysis

“…This notion of two types of happiness is not new; Aristotle postulated that happiness was comprised of two elements: hedonia , or pleasure and eudaimonia , or a sense of meaning (Wolf et al . ) or overall well‐being (Svensson ). Long‐term happiness, which is closer to Aristotle's eudamonia , was explored more frequently in the literature and is the focus of this concept analysis and the comparison with joy.…”

Psychological well-being is aligned to the ethical theory of flourishing

“…Philosophical theories such as ethical pluralism outline the obligation to promote well-being alongside duties like fidelity, gratitude, and justice, with self-improvement outlined as the act to promote one's own good, i.e., one's own health, security, wisdom, and happiness with connected concepts of "moral virtue [33,34] ".…”

When generosity is freedom: Cartesian ethics and the task of care

“…Parte da defesa, arrolada por Noddings, de que a ética do cuidado é uma ética feminina se pauta numa convergência, em meio a tantas divergências, com Gilligan no que diz respeito à tese de que historicamente a tarefa do cuidado, por ter sido associada às mulheres, não teve o devido reconhecimento moral na história da ética (sobre esse ponto ver a diferença dentro de algumas das principais posturasa feminista em relação ao cuidado:Kuhnen, 2010). Quando se recupera o cuidado materno como uma tarefa moral, de algum modo, a ética deixa de habitar exclusivamente a "esfera pública", como ela foi tomada tradicionalmente, para habitar no seio das relações privadas 4 Svensson defende que a felicidade seria própria ao projeto moral de um ponto de vista da realização humana, ao passo que a virtude pode gerar um contentamento subjetivo, individual que não necessariamente coincide com a felicidade(Svensson, 2011). Pressuponho que essa interpretação de Svensson é correta e usarei o termo felicidade para me referir ao objetivo da procura humana pela ação correta moralmente.…”