Hannah Arendt's Tactlessness: Reading Eichmann in Jerusalem

Abstract

This essay engages with the problem of Arendt's historical style, particularly the style of Eichmann in Jerusalem (1963) and what Gersholm Scholem described as its lack of feeling for the suffering of others, its lack of Herzenstakt. Arendt thought that totalitarianism had changed the way in which history must be written; in particular, she thought that the extermination of the Jews of Europe meant that historical writing could no longer conform to classical standards of dispassion and withhold anger. In light of this claim, I examine anger in Arendt's writing in relation both to her reflections on the cognitive meaning of anger in On Violence, particularly the anger of the Black Power movement, but also (and more expansively) the tactlessness of her writing both about Eichmann and the survivor testimony that formed the 'background' to his trial. By drawing on Hans-Georg Gadamer's arguments about the importance of tact, and the ancient Stoic formulation of sensus communis for the methodology of the human sciences, I read Arendt's tactless, abrasive style not as simply dismissive towards the suffering of others, but rather as a key expression of her understanding of political modernity. Arendt's tactlessness signals, I argue, what she thinks of as an abandonment of the political language of 'sentiment.' Again, such an abandonment, I argue, is a result of the pressure that totalitarianism had placed on the possibilities of political and historical writing.Thus you will avoid hatred from the offence by harming nobody gratuitously: from which sensus communis will protect you. SenecaThere is a great temptation to explain away the intrinsically incredible by means of liberal rationalization. In each one of us, there lurks such a liberal, wheedling us with the voice of common sense. Hannah Arendt I have written a wicked book, and feel spotless as the lamb. Herman MelvilleIs it possible to envisage a viable theory of tact in the humanities? Tact has a long history, and for writers like Hans-Georg Gadamer it is bound up with the recovery of the Roman idea of the sensus communis over the course of

Within the heart’s darkness: The role of emotions in Arendt’s political thought

“…Swift (2011) has also argued that Arendt challenges reason–emotion dichotomy, and we find evidence of this throughout her work (Arendt, 1958: 321; 1972: 161; 1979: 441). Generally, Arendt uses the terms ‘rationality’ and ‘reason’ interchangeably to refer to a presumed universal capacity for logical reasoning (cf.…”

“…Anger, for example, can reveal and expose the world (Arendt, 1995 [1968c]: 6). As Simon Swift (2011) has argued, this is a conviction Arendt applies in her own writings. Her response to Eric Voegelin’s critical review of The Origins of Totalitarianism suggests as much: ‘To describe the concentration camps sine ira [without anger] is not to be “objective,” but to condone them’ (Arendt, 1994 [1953]: 403).…”

Evil, thinking, and emotions in Hannah Arendt’s political philosophy: Implications for the teaching of democratic citizenship

“…My point of departure is how some critics saw Arendt's stance as being 'heartless'-a rhetorical mode that runs through her work, from The Origins of Totalitarianism and Eichmann in Jerusalem to several essays and lectures until the very end of her life (Kateb, 1984;Nelson, 2004Nelson, , 2006Swift, 2010). According to Degerman (2019), Arendt's claim that the emotions are apolitical has gained a renewed criticism in recent years.…”

“…As the second epigraph of this paper shows, sentimentality is always a perversion of this emotional shift from compassion to pity. A sentimental response to the other's suffering, blocks the chances of engaging into political action, because in claiming to identify with the other's suffering, the ground for action is swept away (Swift, 2010). However, an alternative to compassion in politics is the principle of solidarity, 'a community of interest with oppressed and exploited' (Arendt, 1965: 90).…”

The Pitfalls of “Love and Kindness”: On the Challenges to Compassion/Pity as a Political Emotion

“…Arendt has neither written about emotions extensively, at least not as extensively as Nussbaum, nor is she of the opinion that emotions should belong into the political realm at all (e.g., Arendt, 1963Arendt, /2016, a crucial point which she emphasises throughout her oeuvre. Arendt's theory is thus not the first choice to consult whenever one wishes to engage in a political theory of emotions, although some publications have sought to illuminate the role of (particular) passions/emotions in her political theory (e.g., Degerman, 2016;Heins, 2007;Lang, 2015;Newcomb, 2007;Swift, 2011).…”