Habitual virtuous action and acting for reasons

Asma, Lieke Joske Franci

doi:10.1080/09515089.2022.2045008

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Most, if not all, defenders of the causal theory of action acknowledge that causal deviance is a problem that needs a solution. Several solutions have been offered (e.g., Aguilar 2012;Mele, 1992;Peacocke, 1979;Schlosser, 2007;Shepherd, 2021), but none of these solutions are taken to be successful (e.g., Asma, 2022;Mayr 2011, p. 128;Schlosser 2007, p. 191;Steward 2012, pp. 57-58).…”

Section: Free Will Causal Chains and Consciously Formed Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If we do not, we cannot act for reasons, as for example Schlosser (2014) maintains. Crucially, this perspective on acting for reasons also suffers from the problem of deviant causal chains; even if my action is caused by a reason I may not act for that reason (Asma, 2022). In recent years, following Anscombe (1963), a different perspective on acting for reasons has gained popularity (e.g., Singh 2020;Thompson, 2008;Wiland, 2012).…”

Section: An Alternative Perspective On Self-determination and Conscio...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This, I maintain, captures an important sense in which self-determination and consciousness are related: if I know what my specific action means to me at a more general level of description and this consciousness -practical knowledge -is the cause of my specific intentional actions, I act for a reason and I determine for myself what to do. I do not need to consciously form an intention or consciously deliberate before or during the action; I need to know what I am doing and in light of which action at a higher description I am doing it (see also Asma, 2022). This proposal does not suffer from deviant causal chains: the climber's letting go of the rope is not caused by his practical knowledge of letting go of the rope, and because of that is not an action.…”

Section: An Alternative Perspective On Self-determination and Conscio...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The relationship between free will and consciousness

Asma

2022

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Reflection on the relationship between free will and consciousness has mainly revolved around Libet-style experiments, for example by criticizing the claim that conscious intentions never cause what we do. Less attention has been paid to whether this response captures the sense in which consciousness is relevant for free will, however. In this paper I argue that scholars seem to accept two assumptions they should reject: (1) that the relationship between free will and consciousness is best characterized in terms of conscious states and/or processes being part of the causal chain leading up to the action, and (2) that the third-person perspective is a suitable means to capturing the relationship between free will and consciousness. I provide an alternative proposal of how free will and consciousness may be related, in which an agent’s self-understanding of what she is doing and why, while acting, takes center stage. In order to capture the relationship between the two, I argue, the first-person perspective should be investigated instead of explained away.

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Section: Free Will Causal Chains and Consciously Formed Intentionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Alternative Perspective On Self-determination and Conscio...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: An Alternative Perspective On Self-determination and Conscio...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation