Habit and the explanation of action

Abstract

In this paper, I synthesize recent work in the philosophy of action to propose an analytic reconstruction of the concept of habit. My main point is that habit (or habitus) can be a central, not just supplemental or auxiliary concept in action theory and the explanation of action. To show this, I systematically analyze the way habits can be used as a resource to explain action while comparing the way habits explain action with the standard way we explain action as being caused by the interplay of beliefs, desires, and intentions. I point to the specific "historical" way that habits can be seen as causes of action and show that the conceptual commitments of habit-based explanations are both more substantial and more robust than intention-based explanations. Once formed, habits act as inclinations and dispositions, being reliably triggered in the requisite context by the appropriate circumstances. Finally, I analyze the core concept of automaticity as applied to habit. I argue that since automaticity is not a unitary concept, different features of automaticity are more central to habit than others, allowing us to differentiate the most representative members of the habit category from more peripheral members.

Max Weber and Charles Taylor: On normative aspects of a theory of human action

“…The orienting bent in this sense is derivatively normative and primarily functional as a dynamic tendency of the system of which actions are contingent events. We are entering the Bourdieusian territory that cognitivist cultural sociologists are now reclaiming in the American scene (Lizardo, 2004(Lizardo, , 2007(Lizardo, , 2021; see also Lizardo et al, 2020;Strand and Lizardo, 2015).…”

“…A central theme in the discussion concerns the modes of operation of culture. Meanings operate practically, habitually, through implicit understandings, schemas and skills that orient agents through a world of meanings (Lizardo, 2004(Lizardo, , 2021Strand and Lizardo, 2015). Meanings also operate at the level of explicit beliefs and representations of the world that allow for more 'reflexive', problem-solving forms of agency (Swidler, 2001: 181-213).…”

What is implicit culture?

“…Once ensconced by practice, all of these cultural elements can become 'implicit' via proceduralization (Karmiloff-Smith, 1995). It is the nature of habitual action to be a-implicit in the sense discussed both in terms of automatic activation by contextual environmental cues and of efficient (non-resource demanding) deployment once activated, unless it is overridden via deliberate, effortful pathways (Lizardo, 2021a).…”

Culture, Cognition, and Internalization

“…That the distinction between "deeply" and "lightly" held culture also applies only to explicitly declared beliefs is implicit but also reasonably clear in Swidler's story. Theoretically, the notion of internalization "depth" in the Spiro/Swidler sense cannot apply to knowledge-how; a skill can be more or less well-honed (in that respect, skill ascriptions carry a normative cast (Douskos 2019) but not a "levels" one) or be more or less habitual (Lizardo 2021). However, the "depth" metaphor does little to illuminate matters since, at similar levels of proficiency, all acquired skills are equally deep in terms of fundamentally altering people's capacities (Lizardo and Strand 2010).…”