Culture, Cognition, and Internalization

Abstract

In this paper, I address the history and systematics of the concept of internalization in cultural theory, noting that while use of the concept declined after its heyday in mid-20th-century functionalism, it is as indispensable now as it was then. I build an account of internalization consistent with recent conceptual distinctions offered in the culture and cognition literature. Taking the (relatively easy) case of the internalization of belief first, I problematize a popular conception of how declarative forms of personal culture are internalized via linguistic communication but flag a potentially promising solution. In this alternative story, the same "dialectical" model linking personal and public culture accounts for the internalization of both declarative and nondeclarative culture, allowing us to tell the same general story for the internalization of "knowledge-that" and "knowledge-how." I then discuss conceptual personal culture as a third general type of personal culture ("knowledge-what"), standing between the purely declarative and nondeclarative. I show how the model of internalization developed in the case of beliefs and skills also applies to it with minor modifications. I close by outlining some implications of the theory developed here for clarifying such problems as theorizing degrees of internalization and the relative fragmentation of culture in persons.

Two traditions of cognitive sociology: An analysis and assessment of their cognitive and methodological assumptions

“…This means that people are assumed to "internally reconstruct" the meanings of external (or public) symbols and the contents of their conversation partner's utterances (Lizardo, 2021). In addition to providing an embodied account of public cultural meanings, Lizardo (2017Lizardo ( , 2021 has proposed a distinction between declarative and non-declarative personal culture in order to systematize analytical concepts used by cognitive and other cultural sociologists. The basic idea of this distinction is that declarative culture is encoded in long-term memory in the form of propositions that can be expressed by using language while non-declarative culture is encoded in the form of multimodal and multidimensional networks of associations and embodied skills that cannot be linguistically expressed.…”

“…Ignatow, 2007;Rotolo, 2021;Winchester, 2016) assume that groups of individuals have acquired or internalized the same implicit cultural schemas and embodied metaphors through social learning during their cognitive development. However, these authors have not provided detailed models about cognitive and developmental mechanisms operating in these social learning processes (however, see Lizardo, 2017Lizardo, , 2021Cerulo et al, 2021). This is a serious problem since for example Turner (1994Turner ( , 2002 has criticized practice theories in the social sciences for their postulation of the implicitly learned cognitive dispositions, presuppositions, schemas and frameworks shared by groups of people, while failing to specify any plausible and reliable cognitive mechanism through which their implicit social learning or transmission could happen.…”

“…Some recent articles have taken first steps into this direction (e.g. Cerulo et al, 2021;Lizardo, 2017Lizardo, , 2021. For example, Lizardo's (2021) distinctions between the processes of socialization, internalization and enculturation seem to provide useful conceptual tools to address these issues but more work is still required.…”

What is implicit culture?

“…The notion of 'internalization' is itself a complex one with a sordid history in cultural analysis(Quinn et al, 2018). SeeLizardo (2021b) for a recent attempt to unpack the various implications of the concept.3 A taxonomic approach to 'cultural things' was first explicitly advocated by the anthropologist MarvinHarris (1964). What follows is in the spirit of that endeavor, without endorsing the outdated operationism and the implausible behaviorism.4 One raised by a perspicuous anonymous reader.5 As pointed out by a reviewer, the naturalistic approach also facilitates the much-needed task of developing explanations of cultural phenomena grounded in discoverable cognitive mechanisms, an endeavor with much to recommend for it(Sarkia et al, 2020).6 The idea of 'core realization' comes fromWilson's (2001) theory of 'wide realization.'…”

“…2 2 The notion of ‘internalization’ is itself a complex one with a sordid history in cultural analysis (Quinn et al., 2018). See Lizardo (2021b) for a recent attempt to unpack the various implications of the concept. …”