Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision

Andreoni, James; Gee, Laura K.

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.08.003

Cited by 171 publications

(118 citation statements)

References 32 publications

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“…They show that participants are unwilling to implement equilibrium punishment which allows some players to free-ride. Andreoni and Gee (2012) investigate the formation of centralized sanctions through voting for a sanctioning scheme that punishes only the lowest contributor and find that full contributions are quickly achieved at very low punishment costs. Importantly, these articles focus on sanctions that are executed automatically; that is, once an implemented rule is violated, players are punished with a certain probability while contribution decisions are perfectly observable.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Nicklisch

Grechenig

Thöni

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Abstract We study information conditions under which individuals are willing to delegate their sanctioning power to a central authority. We design a public goods game in which players can move between institutional environments, and we vary the observability of others' contributions. We find that the relative popularity of centralized sanctioning crucially depends on the interaction between the observability of the cooperation of others and the absence of punishment targeted at cooperative individuals. While central institutions do not outperform decentralized sanctions under perfect information, large parts of the population are attracted by central institutions that rarely punish cooperative individuals in environments with limited observability. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Nicklisch

Grechenig

Thöni

2016

Journal of Public Economics

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“…Falkinger and Fehr (2000), Andreoni and Gee (2012) et al (1992), Fehr andGächter (2000), andFehr andGächter (2002) started with the basic idea of mutual monitoring and punishment among the members of a group; focusing in particular on the question whether certain behavioral norms can emerge, even in the absence of formal institutions with a centralized structure. Still, there are some studies where players do vote over the implementation of decentralized sanction regimes (Putterman et al (2011), Markussen et al (2014, Kamei et al (2014)).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents

Kube

Schaube

Schildberg-Hörisch

et al. 2015

European Economic Review

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“…Previous work has shown that there are a number of ways to increase the effectiveness of punishment by increasing the severity of punishment [8], coordinating punishment through a centralized mechanism [9][10][11][12], eliminating counter-punishment [13][14][15], eliminating antisocial punishment [16] or by allowing a longer timeline for learning how to use punishment [4]. In this paper, we propose using emotion regulation to increase the effectiveness of punishment.…”

Section: Related Experimentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods

Gee

Lyu

Urry

2017

Games

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Abstract:The ability to punish free-riders can increase the provision of public goods. However, sometimes, the benefit of increased public good provision is outweighed by the costs of punishments. One reason a group may punish to the point that net welfare is reduced is that punishment can express anger about free-riding. If this is the case, then tools that regulate emotions could decrease the use of punishments while keeping welfare high, possibly depending on pre-existing levels of aggression. In this lab experiment, we find that adopting an objective attitude (objective), through a form of emotion regulation called cognitive reappraisal, decreases the use of punishments and makes a statistically insignificant improvement to both net earnings and self-reported emotions compared to a control condition (natural). Although the interaction between the emotion regulation treatment and level of aggression is not significant, only low aggression types reduce their punishments; the results are of the same direction, but statistically insignificant for high aggression types. Overall, our findings suggest that pairing emotion regulation with punishments can decrease the use of punishments without harming monetary and mental welfare.

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Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision

Cited by 171 publications

References 32 publications

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Information-sensitive Leviathans

Institution formation and cooperation with heterogeneous agents

Anger Management: Aggression and Punishment in the Provision of Public Goods

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