“…Rebel groups that govern in civil wars exhibit marked differences in the nature of political and institutional development and service provision they undertake at the local level, practices which in turn shape the relative extent of armed group intervention in local affairs upon interaction with civilian preferences and local conditions (Wickham-Crowley 1987, Bakonyi and Stuvoy 2005, Weinstein 2007, Kasfir 2008, Mampilly 2011, Staniland 2012b, Huang 2013, Kalyvas 2014, Sukyens 2014, Barter 2014. Within the existing literature, the general assumption is that rebels employ governance practices and design local-level institutions in an effort to extract resources for the fight against the incumbent regime, and seek to do so in the most cost-efficient manner given local circumstances, preferences, and the demands of fighting (Kasfir 2005, Kalyvas 2006, Metelits 2010, Keister 2011, Arjona 2013. The general theoretical implication underlying this assumption is that armed groups should employ governance practices that allow them to most efficiently extract resources for fighting, keeping in mind both local civilian preferences and the costly, resource-intense nature of waging war against the state (Sinno 2008, Staniland 2012a, Hazen 2013.…”