Growth enhancing policy is the means to sustain the environment

Economides, George; Philippopoulos, Apostolis

doi:10.1016/j.red.2007.05.001

Cited by 66 publications

(67 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…2 For a survey of these issues see Baumol and Oates (1988), Nordhaus (1994), Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Xepapadeas (2005). 3 For an analysis of the design and the effects of these two policies see respectively Gradus and Smulders (1993), Smulders and Gradus (1996), Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) and Gupta and Barman (2009) for abatement policy and Pigou (1924), Baumol and Oates (1988), Mohtadi (1996) and Helfand et al (2003) for Pigouvian tax. Note that other possible instruments for public intervention in environmental economics, not analysed in this work, are property rights, binding quota restrictions and markets for pollution permits.…”

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confidence: 99%

Pigouvian tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

Baiardi

Menegatti

2011

J. Econ.

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The paper examines the effects of environmental uncertainty on Pigouvian tax and abatement policy used, either separately or contemporaneously, to counteract pollution. We discuss these effects by introducing three kinds of risk: risk on the environmental quality, risk on the impact of pollution and risk on the impact of abatement. For each case we determine the conditions ensuring that risk increases the size of public intervention and provide an economic interpretation and some parallelisms with other risk problems. The last part of the paper generalizes some of our results to the case of N -th order risk changes.

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confidence: 99%

Pigouvian tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

Baiardi

Menegatti

2011

J. Econ.

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“…Although in this setting tax is a voluntary contribution, citizens always declare a positive fraction of their income, as we will verify below, because they care about their offsprings' education and environmental quality. Politicians 14 Given that public spending on abatement Π t−1 is financed by tax revenues which are collected from individuals' income derived from their human capital, as it will be explained below. 15 Since all agents have the same level of human capital we omit the subscript i = c, p from the level of human capital h t .…”

Section: Citizenmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Replacing the equilibrium values for (z * 3 , ϕ * 3 ) from equation (24) into equations. (13), (14) we obtain the following system of two autonomous non-linear first order difference equations…”

Section: Dynamic Behavior Of the System Of Difference Equationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption and Environmental Policy: An Alternative Perspective

Λαπατίνας¹,

Λίτινα²,

Sartzetakis³

2011

SSRN Journal

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We construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two selffulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated with high and another with low corruption. Corrupted politicians induce high levels of tax evasion, reducing total public funds and thus environmental protection activities. This result is in accordance with existing empirical evidence and implies that environmental policies may fail in corrupt countries where they are used as means of supporting rent seeking activities instead of protecting the environment. A higher level political authority could intervene and force the low corruption equilibrium by choosing the appropriate tax rate and, through institutional changes, the rates of peculation. Keywords Department of Economics, University of Macedonia AbstractWe construct an overlapping generations model in which agents live through two periods; childhood and adulthood. Each agent makes choices only as an adult, based on her utility that depends on her own consumption and the human capital and environmental quality endowed to her offspring. Entering adulthood, agents choose randomly between two occupations: citizens and politicians. Citizens are the only producers of a single good and choose the proportion of their income to declare to the tax authorities. Politicians decide upon the allocation of the tax revenue between environmental protection and education activities, taking as given the rates of peculation in each activity. In this context, two self-fulfilling stable equilibria can emerge, one associated with high and another with low corruption. Corrupted politicians induce high levels of tax evasion, reducing total public funds and thus environmental protection activities. This result is in accordance with existing empirical evidence and implies that environmental policies may fail in corrupt countries where they are used as means of supporting rent seeking activities instead of protecting the environment. A higher level political authority could intervene and force the low corruption equilibrium by choosing the appropriate tax rate and, through institutional changes, the rates of peculation.JEL codes: H2, H26, H3, Q56, Q58 * We would like to thank Theodore Palivos for insightful comments.

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“…Namely, condition (15) reflects that giving up a unit of K P yields a benefit (from the discount rate and the avoided depreciation) as well as a loss equal to the value of the marginal productivity of produced capital; condition (16) tells a similar story except the loss is in the accumulation of human capital; condition (17) shows that, for each unit of K S that is relinquished, the value foregone includes the direct impact on utility, the value of the marginal productivity of social capital, its contribution to both human and social capital accumulation, and its benefits on environmental protection). Finally, condition (18) highlights the value of the natural capital stock to utility as well as its role in future regeneration.…”

Section: Optimal Growthmentioning

confidence: 99%

Externalities in an endogenous growth model with social and natural capital

Roseta-Palma¹,

Ferreira-Lopes²,

Sequeira³

2010

Ecological Economics

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Models of economic growth are typically based on the use of one or more stocks of productive assets to create goods for utilitygenerating consumption. The roles played by man-made capital, natural capital, and human capital have been explored in the literature, and more recently the notion of social capital has been brought to the fore. This paper provides an attempt to construct an inclusive model of growth, analysing externalities and distortions due to market failures linked with social capital and environmental problems.JEL Classification: O13, O15, O41, Q20.

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Growth enhancing policy is the means to sustain the environment

Cited by 66 publications

References 10 publications

Pigouvian tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

Pigouvian tax, abatement policies and uncertainty on the environment

Corruption and Environmental Policy: An Alternative Perspective

Externalities in an endogenous growth model with social and natural capital

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