Group cooperation under uncertainty

Gong, Min; Baron, Jonathan; Kunreuther, Howard

doi:10.1007/s11166-009-9080-2

Cited by 34 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 50 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Although some possible explanations were proposed for the group cooperativeness under uncertainty in Gong et al (2009), we could not verify or refute any of them as they were based on previous literature rather than empirical studies.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

“…In Charness and Jackson (2009), 90% of participants whose decisions were affected by having a silent partner played a less risky strategy when choosing for themselves and their partner than when playing only for themselves so to avoid ex-post guilt. Group members may also choose to cooperate to reduce risks in an effort to avoid ex-post blame (Gong et al, 2009). If one group member suggests Not Invest and a large loss occurs later, then other group members may blame her for the loss.…”

Section: Rationale For the Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In a deterministic prisoner's dilemma (DPD) game, 3-person groups cooperated less than did individuals (32% vs. 78%), but cooperated more than individuals in a stochastic Prisoner's Dilemma (SPD) game (52% vs. 22%) (Gong et al, 2009). In these two-agent controlled laboratory experiments, groups always played against another group, and an individual against another individual.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There were two interesting group-individual differences in Gong et al (2009). First, groups cooperated less than individuals in the DPD game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Data analysis on participants' strategies, survey questionnaires, and recorded discussions in Gong et al (2009) revealed that three major factors (greed, fear, and persuasion power) that underlied the usual discontinuity effect were reduced in the stochastic environment.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

Gong¹,

Baron

Kunreuther

2012

Theory Decis

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Previous research has discovered a curious phenomenon: groups cooperate less than individuals in a deterministic prisoner's dilemma game but cooperate more than individuals when uncertainty is introduced into the game. We conduct two studies to examine three possible processes that may have driven groups to be more cooperative than individuals to reduce risks: group risk concern, group cooperation expectation, and social pressure. We find that ex-post guilt aversion and ex-post blame avoidance under uncertainty cause group members to be more risk concerned than individuals. This concern drives groups to choose the cooperation (and risk-reduction) strategy more frequently than individuals do. Groups also have higher cooperation expectations for the other group than individuals have for the other individual. We find no evidence of social pressure pushing groups to be nicer and more cooperative than individuals.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 92%

Section: Rationale For the Studymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There were two interesting group-individual differences in Gong et al (2009). First, groups cooperated less than individuals in the DPD game.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

Gong¹,

Baron

Kunreuther

2012

Theory Decis

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

Gong

Heal

Krantz

et al. 2014

Behavioral Decision Making

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Can subsidies promote Pareto‐optimum coordination? We found that partially subsidizing the cooperative actions for two out of six players in a laboratory coordination game usually produced better coordination and higher total social welfare with both deterministic and stochastic payoffs. Not only were the subsidized players more likely to cooperate (choose the Pareto‐optimum action), but the unsubsidized players increased their expectations on how likely others would cooperate, and they cooperated more frequently themselves. After removal of the subsidy, high levels of coordination continued in most groups with stochastic payoffs but declined in deterministic ones. This carry‐over disparity between the deterministic and stochastic settings was consistent with the economic theories that agents were more likely to keep the status quo option under uncertainty than without uncertainty. Hence, players with stochastic payoffs were more likely to keep the high coordination level (status quo) brought by the subsidy in the previous subsidy session. A post‐game survey also indicated that with stochastic payoffs, players focused on risk reduction. Temporary subsidies promoted lasting coordination because even after subsidy was removed, players still assumed that others players would prefer reduced risks from cooperation. With deterministic payoffs, however, the subsidy might crowd out other rationales for coordination, with many players indicating that the subsidy was the only reason for anyone to cooperate. Hence, the coordination level dropped when the subsidy was removed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

show abstract

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Atanasov

Kunreuther

2015

Behavioral Decision Making

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs-in the absence of group deliberation-affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three-person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow-up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low-risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone.

show abstract

Group cooperation under uncertainty

Cited by 34 publications

References 50 publications

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

Why do groups cooperate more than individuals to reduce risks?

The Role of Subsidies in Coordination Games with Interconnected Risk

Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About