Cautious Defection: Group Representatives Cooperate and Risk Less than Individuals

Abstract

Individuals often make decisions that affect groups, yet the propensities of group representatives are not as well understood than those of independent decision makers or deliberating groups. We ask how responsibility for group payoffs-in the absence of group deliberation-affects the choice. The experiment utilizes the Interdependent Security Dilemma paradigm. In its deterministic version, the game is identical to a finitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. In the stochastic version, potential losses are larger but uncertain, occurring with a predefined probability when one or both players choose to forgo investment in protection. Participants were assigned to play either as individuals, or as representatives of three-person groups, with each member's choices equally likely to determine the group's payoffs. In the deterministic condition, individuals were more likely to invest (cooperate) than group representatives (80% vs. 62% of rounds). In the stochastic condition, the pattern was reversed as representatives were slightly, but not significantly, more likely to invest than individuals (46% vs. 40%). The significant interaction effect suggested that group representatives were not only less cooperative but also more risk averse than individuals. A follow-up study supported this account by showing participants who construed the invest strategy as low-risk than those who perceived this strategy to be high risk. Overall, group representatives exhibited a tendency to act more competitively and more cautiously than individuals acting alone.

Risk preferences in self–other decisions: The effect of payoff allocation framing

“…Extensive research has found that monetary allocation affects individuals' choices in decision making (e.g., Atanasov & Kunreuther, 2016; Sutter, 2009). This research focused on how monetary allocation in a two‐person context described to the decision makers affected their decisions, especially when the final outcome was consistent across conditions.…”

“…Decision makers tended to make riskier choices in the self‐allocation frame than in the other‐allocation frame. The other‐allocation frame, such as the practice of incentivizing agents, has been studied (Atanasov & Kunreuther, 2016; Pahlke et al, 2015). Similarly, the self‐allocation condition can also be found in daily life, such as in decisions made by a single person in a partnership system, but according to our review of the literature, has been underexplored.…”

Are Decisions Made by Group Representatives More Risk Averse? The Effect of Sense of Responsibility

“…Such tasks are cognitively complex, have lower test–retest stability, and produce greater noise in the data, especially for individuals with lower math ability (Dave, Eckel, Johnson, & Rojas, ). Furthermore, hypothetical options have little real consequence for the decision maker, although one or a few decisions were extracted to be played for real payment in some research (e.g., Andersson et al, ; Atanasov & Kunreuther, ; Pahlke et al, ). In contrast, the present research used three laboratory‐based behavioral measures of risk taking (BART, Lejuez et al, ; Marble Risk Task, Frankenhuis & Karremans, ; one‐shot gambling task).…”

“…As the decision is often ultimately left to one person (i.e., the representative), there is little chance for the decision maker to pass on the responsibility. Some previous research suggests that a sense of responsibility increases risk aversion (e.g., Anderson & Galinsky, 2006;Atanasov & Kunreuther, 2016;Charness & Jackson, 2009). In a classic study, Wallach and Kogan (1965) showed that individuals became more risk seeking when decisions were made following group discussions (i.e., risk-shift phenomenon).…”

Value from Control: Subjective Valuations of Negotiations by Principals and Agents

“…However, employing agents in negotiations also comes with undeniable costs. Agents may have goals that conflict with those of their principals (Aaldering, Greer, Van Kleef, & De Dreu, ; Eisenhardt, ); they are often reluctant to admit their biases (Northcraft & Neale, ); and they tend to be swayed by competitive directions more than by cooperative directions (Atanasov & Kunreuther, ; Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez‐Marin, ).…”