Moral psychology has come a long way from the philosophically informed and empirically grounded moral developmental theories of Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969 and Gilligan (1982), and moral psychology and moral philosophy have been enormously enriched by recent empirical findings and pioneering theoretical explorations in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and individual and social psychology and psychopathology (for a useful review see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c. I wholeheartedly endorse the joint enrichment and interpenetration of academic disciplines exhibited by the best works in this recent research tradition, despite some qualifications about the intellectual overreach of some recent moral psychological theories based upon it. In this paper I focus on one aspect of this recent work in moral psychology and philosophy, namely its impoverished treatment of the social dimensions of moral psychology, despite the common appeal to the findings of experimental social psychology.