On the Social Dimensions of Moral Psychology

Abstract

Moral psychology has come a long way from the philosophically informed and empirically grounded moral developmental theories of Piaget (1932), Kohlberg (1969 and Gilligan (1982), and moral psychology and moral philosophy have been enormously enriched by recent empirical findings and pioneering theoretical explorations in evolutionary biology, cognitive psychology and neuroscience, and individual and social psychology and psychopathology (for a useful review see Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008a, 2008b, 2008c. I wholeheartedly endorse the joint enrichment and interpenetration of academic disciplines exhibited by the best works in this recent research tradition, despite some qualifications about the intellectual overreach of some recent moral psychological theories based upon it. In this paper I focus on one aspect of this recent work in moral psychology and philosophy, namely its impoverished treatment of the social dimensions of moral psychology, despite the common appeal to the findings of experimental social psychology.

Guilt as a Motivator for Moral Judgment: An Autobiographical Memory Study

“…In other words, the north European Protestant culture (Swedish participants) seems to promote higher feelings of guilt and by that less moral intention of willing to do wrong in economic compared to social moral situations; indicating the latter type of situations as less socially regulated and the role of guilt, as negative emotion, to regulate behavior (Frijda et al, 1989; Scherer and Wallbott, 1994). Generally, this is also in line with some previous research indicating social (Kortenkamp and Moore, 2006; Greenwood, 2011; Knez, 2013, 2016b) and economic/resource (Hardin, 1968; Agerström and Björklund, 2009) dimensions of moral dilemmas; situational aspects that may activate different facets of the moral self (Aquino et al, 2009). …”

“…The two types of situations were included because previous research has indicated social (Kortenkamp and Moore, 2006; Greenwood, 2011; Knez, 2013, 2016b) and economic/resource (Hardin, 1968; Agerström and Björklund, 2009) dimensions of moral dilemmas; in the words of Aquino et al (2009, p. 124): “…situational factors may activate a person’s moral identity or they may activate alternative facets of identity, thereby increasing or decreasing the current accessibility of the moral self-schema within the working self-concept.” Some previous research has also indicated that morality and self-conscious emotions may differ across cultures (Markus and Kitayama, 1991; Wang, 2008; Wong, 2009). For example, Vauclair et al (2014) investigating four-country/two-culture samples reported some type of relativism in morality dimensions across cultures.…”

Wrongness in different relationships: Relational context effects on moral judgment

“…It would seem, therefore, that relational context is inherently important in understanding variability in moral judgment. Indeed, several major scholars have stressed this point (e.g., Bloom, 2011;Fiske, 1991;Greenwood, 2011;Rai & Fiske, 2011). Yet oddly enough, relational context is given scant attention in the field of moral psychology (and also in moral philosophy; e.g., Kant, 1785Kant, /1989).…”

Social cognition, social neuroscience, and evolutionary social psychology: What's missing?

“…As noted earlier, Lewin () and Kelley () demonstrated long ago that socially engaged or ‘socially anchored’ beliefs and attitudes are more resistant to change by persuasive communications than individually engaged beliefs and attitudes, and it would be interesting to discover if this difference is reflected in the neurophysiological data. Along similar lines, it would be interesting to discover whether our social engagement of moral principles limits the scope of their application––whether, for example, we are more inclined to help represented members of our own social reference groups as opposed to complete strangers, or whether the socially engaged attitudes of some but not other social reference groups promote extending the ‘moral circle’ to strangers (Greenwood, ), and whether such differences (if any there are) are reflected in the neurophysiological data.…”