GROUNDS OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY: A Response

Abstract

Linking theses of Plato, Wittgenstein, and Weber, section I argues that identification of central cases and settling of focal meanings depend upon the theorist's purpose(s) and, in the case of theory about human affairs—theory adequately attentive to the four irreducible orders in which human persons live and act—upon the purposes for which we intelligibly and intelligently act. Among these purposes, primacy (centrality) is to be accorded (by acknowledgement, not fiat) to purposes which are, as best the theorist can judge, reasonable and fit to be adopted by anyone, the theorist included. Section II defends the reasonableness (and hence entitlement to universal assent) of practical and moral judgments, against Michael Perry's ultimately nihilist claims that egoism's challenge to moral normativity has gone unanswered and that “reason for A” does not entail “reason for” anyone else. Section III takes up Steven Smith's suggestion that such subjectivism is encouraged by the talk in Natural Law and Natural Rights of “pursuing goods,” talk which (he argues) is individualistic and neglectful of (other) persons, inimical to an understanding of friendship, and impotent in the face of egoism. Here as elsewhere the key is to grasp that understanding any basic or intrinsic human good is to understand it as good for anyone like me and thus—since as I instantiate and embody a universal, viz. human being—as a good common to (good for) anyone and everyone. Section IV argues that common good (which includes respect for human rights, and the Rule of Law) gives reason for exercise and acceptance of authority, and for allegiance, even (and in a sense, especially) in time of breakdown. Section V argues that natural law theory is no more dependent on affirming God's existence than any other theory is, in any of the four orders of theory, but equally that is not safe for atheists. For, like any other sound theory, it suggests and is consistent with questions and answers about its grounds, in this case about the source of its normativity and of the human nature that its normative universals presuppose and affirm; and the answers are those argued for, too abstemiously, in the last chapter of NLNR and, more adequately, in the equivalent chapter of Aquinas.

Theoretical and Normative Foundation of Child Rights

“…It has also been criticized for creating the legal platform for obnoxious regimes insensitive to human rights in general and child rights in particular, such as the Nazi regime, the apartheid rule in South Africa, and suppressive military dictatorships in Africa (Leiter, 2003;Goldsworthy, 1990). According to Dworkin, positive law has been criticized for lending credence to immoral and obnoxious laws and most times is undeserving of its title as "law" (Dworkin, 1977(Dworkin, , 1986Finnis, 2000Finnis, , p. 1597.…”

The Figuring of Morality in Adjudication: Not so Special?*

“…Indeed, morality would have no sense if such were the case. One's personal moral beliefs may or may not be true : “If and only if there are moral beliefs that are true is there morality , such as could concern a reasonable person when deliberating towards choice and action, or when engaging in philosophical reflection and a critical inquiry into the truth of these propositions about what should and should not be chosen and done” (Finnis 2008, 321).…”