Grounding and ontological dependence

Abstract

Recent metaphysics has seen a surge of interest in grounding-a relation of non-causal determination underlying a distinctive kind of explanation common in philosophy. In this article, I investigate the connection between grounding and another phenomenon of great interest to metaphysics: ontological dependence. There are interesting parallels between the two phenomena: for example, both are commonly invoked through the use of "dependence" terminology, and there is a great deal of overlap in the motivations typically appealed to when introducing them. I approach the question of the relationship between grounding and ontological dependence through an investigation of their modal connections (or lack thereof). I argue, firstly, that on the common assumption that grounding is factive, it can be shown that no known variety of rigid ontological dependence is either necessary or sufficient for grounding. I also offer some suggestions in support of the claim that this generalizes to every possible form of rigid ontological dependence. I then broaden the discussion by considering a non-factive conception of grounding, as well as by looking at forms of generic (rather than rigid) ontological dependence. I argue that there is at least one form of rigid ontological dependence that is sufficient for non-factive grounding, and that a form of generic dependence may be necessary (but not sufficient) both for factive and non-factive grounding. However, justifying even these fairly weak modal connections between grounding and ontological dependence turns out to require some quite specific and substantive assumptions about the two phenomena that have only rarely been discussed.

Atomism and Fundamentality

“…But note that Schaffer wants to subsume what I have called grounding under his notion as well; he would here see a case of ontological dependence between facts. This view is criticized in Schnieder (2017) and Ryhdéhn (2018). I may certainly have misunderstood what Schaffer told me, and/or misremember it.…”

The Unity of Dependence

“…Despite this, it seems undeniable that there is at least some substantive connection between the two relations. As Henrik Rydéhn says, there is ‘a great deal of overlap in the motivations typically appealed to when introducing them’ (Rydéhn 2021: 1232).…”

“…Given that I propose we analyze ontological dependence in terms of grounding, it is important to have a solid grasp on what we are analyzing. It is commonly recognized that there are two distinct forms of ontological dependence: rigid ontological dependence and generic ontological dependence (Tahko and Lowe 2016: §1; Rydéhn 2021). Rigid ontological dependence is taken to be a one-to-one relation, holding between two specific entities.…”

“…It is also worth noting that the issue of the factivity of grounding has not received a massive amount of attention. (For more, see Rydéhn 2021; Fine 2012: 52; Leuenberger 2014: 232). For the time being, I will assume the non-factive view of grounding, on which grounding relations can be correctly said to hold in worlds other than our own, though admittedly primarily for the pressure presented by this case.…”

Building low level causation out of high level causation

“…(I also follow Schaffer [2009], Rosen [2010] and Audi [2012] in treating ground as a relation, in contrast to those who regiment grounding talk with a sentential operator, like Correia [2010] and Fine [2012a].) If one insists on reserving the term ground for a relation that holds between facts, then the relation I have in mind might be termed metaphysical or ontological dependence (see Rydéhn, 2018). There is every reason for those who are happy to relate facts with ground to be happy to relate all manner of other things with metaphysical dependence (e.g.…”