Atomism and Fundamentality

Abstract

The paper focusses on two claims about metaphysical structure: Atomism and Fundamentalism. The first of these claims says that there are mereological atoms, i.e. minimal elements in the mereological structure of reality. The second says that there are fundamental truths, i.e. minimal elements in the grounding structure of reality. A philosopher who defended both of these claims was Bernard Bolzano; the present paper is an exploration of his views on the matter.

Leibniz and Bolzano on conceptual containment

“…Let me give two brief examples that illustrate how serious Bolzano takes mereological considerations when talking about concepts. First, when he argues for the existence of simple ideas, he relies on mereological atomism, that is, the mereological principle “that every object, even the most complex, must have parts that are not themselves complex, but simple” (WL §61 [I, 263f]; see Schnieder, 2020 for discussion). Second, because of certain mereological considerations, he was troubled by the question of whether there can be multiple occurrences of the same idea in a given complex idea.…”

The Grounds and the Components of Concepts

“…I, §56-65, p. 243- 296). Of particular interest is the argument for mereologically simple concepts in terms of grounding ( §61, p. 263f, seeSchnieder, 2020).10 This problem as a problem for mereological conceptions of concepts is already present in Leibniz(Mates, 1986, 61f) and it has been explicitly pointed out byBolzano (1978, 148f); seeKünne (1997Künne ( , 223-226) and (2001Künne ( [2008) for discussion).…”