Green fresh product cost sharing contracts considering freshness-keeping effort

Wang, Guoli; Ding, Peiqi; Chen, Huiru; Mu, Jing

doi:10.1007/s00500-019-03828-4

Cited by 34 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…According to the literature on green innovation [13,19,45], consumers have higher utility purchasing green products with green innovation, so their willingness-to-pay increases, leading to an increase in market demand. We utilize a linear demand function, D = 1 + e − p, to capture the relationship among the market demand, price, and the green innovation effort, where p is the retail price and e is the level of green innovation efforts.…”

Section: Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many multinational automobile companies (such as Mercedes-Benz in 1987, GM in 1997, and Toyota in 2000 have established R&D partnerships with Chinese partners [15]. Revenue-sharing contracts [16][17][18] and cost-sharing contracts [19,20] are effective mechanisms to promote cooperation among supply chain members [21]. Revenue-sharing contracts imply that a retailer pays a manufacturer the wholesale price of each purchase, plus a percentage of the retailer's revenue [22].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract

Zhang

Chai

2019

Sustainability

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Green innovation, implemented by enterprises, contributes to sustainable development and environmental protection. However, because of the high cost and high risk of green innovation, enterprises are reluctant to step into green innovation activities in practice. Government subsidies are conducive to promoting green innovation in enterprises. To investigate firms’ preferences for green innovation, we consider a three-player game in a supply chain where a government offers subsidies (price, innovation, or both subsidies) to a manufacturer and a retailer, while the latter two players cooperate with each other through contracts (revenue-sharing and cost-sharing contracts). By exploring the impacts of government subsidies and cooperative contracts on the optimal level of green innovation efforts and profits of participants, we find that: (1) for green innovation that leads to increased production costs, the government should subsidize both the retailer and the manufacturer to improve the level of green innovation; (2) the revenue-sharing contract is more effective than the cost-sharing contract under the premise of government subsidies; and (3) the revenue-sharing ratio decreases in production and innovation costs, while the cost-sharing ratio increases in these two costs.

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Section: Assumptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Drives Green Innovation? A Game Theoretic Analysis of Government Subsidy and Cooperation Contract

Zhang

Chai

2019

Sustainability

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“…Wang et al 24 ; Feng et al 25 Supplier-retailer Supply-sales Sensitivity coefficient of market freshness and the effort of keeping products fresh cost coefficient Optimal operational and financing strategies for medium-sized enterprises.…”

Section: Manufacturerdistributormentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The research methods used for the supply-chain optimization of FAPs mainly include mathematical modeling, the Nash game, the Stalberg game, the evolutionary game, and the cooperative game. [10][11][12][13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23][24][25][26][27] Relevant game theory methods were therefore used in this study to describe the competition and cooperation relationship among the main bodies of the FAPs supply chain with the background of the COVID-19 pandemic. In the context of COVID-19, the Stackelberg game was used in this study to investigate the coordination of a FAPs three-level supply chain composed of suppliers, TPL providers, and retailers to ensure the supply of FAPs to metropolitan residents.…”

Section: Preservation Model Preservation Strategy Of Fapsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Prevention schemes for future fresh agricultural products (FAPs) supply chain: mathematical model and experience of guaranteeing the supply of FAPs during the COVID‐19 pandemic

2021

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BACKGROUND The COVID‐19 outbreak caused short‐term disruptions in the supply chain of fresh agricultural products (FAPs), which exposed the vulnerability of the existing FAP supply chain. With pandemic control being widely coordinated, the supply chain of FAPs was gradually optimized and improved. However, after the outbreak of COVID‐19, achieving an effective supply of FAPs in future pandemics has become a key issue. The present work therefore aimed to construct a three‐level supply chain based on the Stackelberg game model, consisting of suppliers, third‐party logistics (TPL), and retailers, to guarantee the supply of FAPs. COVID‐19 pandemic factors such as virus infection coefficients and pandemic prevention efforts were fully integrated into the model. RESULTS Compared with the wholesale prices of FAPs, preservation efforts and pandemic prevention efforts have huge impacts on the retail prices of FAPs. When suppliers are in the leading position, the quality assurance effort level is positively correlated with the optimal profit. Compared with this situation, when FAP retailers are in the leading position, TPL providers show higher levels of pandemic prevention effort and FAP preservation effort. With an increase in consumer preference for pandemic prevention, the profits of supply‐chain members when FAP retailers are in the leading position will gradually increase. CONCLUSION This study reveals an effective supply mechanism for FAPs in metropolitan areas during the COVID‐19 pandemic and describes the authors' experience of guaranteeing the quality and safety of FAPs for future pandemic cases. © 2021 Society of Chemical Industry.

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