Greasing the wheels: Pork and public goods contributions in a legislative bargaining experiment

Abstract

When a legislature bargains over funds for pork and public goods, and the funds come from a common budget, increased spending on the public good means greater payoff equality since it comes at the expense of pork. This paper explores whether inequity aversion then leads to greater public goods spending. Using both theory and a laboratory experiment we show inequity aversion generally decreases inequity within a coalition by limiting proposer power. However, this does not always mean greater public goods contributions because the types of proposals passed change in equilibrium. In addition, the experiment investigates the theoretical prediction that increasing players' relative preference for pork can increase public goods contributions. We show that while average public goods contributions remain unchanged, there is evidence at the individual level that subjects hold out for higher public goods contributions as predicted.

The Effects of Increasing versus Decreasing Private Goods on Legislative Bargaining: Experimental Evidence

“…More recent work incorporates simultaneously bargaining over private and public goods. See Fréchette, Kagel and Morelli (2012) and Christiansen (2010). 2 Details regarding these outcomes will be reported on below.…”