Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions

Dealing with politics for money and power in infrastructure

“…46 See also Hall (2007) concerning the experience of electricity private firms in Latin America. 47 See Guasch andStraub (2005, 2009) for more discussion 48 Clearly, the decision to keep prices regulated can be part of a truly benevolent decision. The point here is simply the fact that the argument can be misused to hide corruption because it is associated with a benevolent idea.…”

“…Constitutional reforms have removed constraints on reelection of individual politicians, while fiscal reforms have provided the national level with relatively more authority on spending decisions compared to local governments. 51 The executive authority will often-albeit not always-be substantially stronger in a presidential system than in a parliamentarian system-where the ministers are accountable to the parliament even if they are appointed by a prime minister. The fact that many countries changed from parliamentary to presidential system in the 1990s, particularly in Africa, and the fact that parliaments are often overruled by strong presidents, as increasingly observed in Latin America, have spurred debate about the mechanisms behind this change and its potential implications for governance.…”

“…It is not easy to document this resistance since communication strategies can be extensively used by public and private organizations to manipulate public opinion. 51 Greater authority in the executive may have increased the attractiveness of minister posts. The party whip has become stronger when party loyalty is rewarded with a now more unchecked minister post, thereby weakening individual voice and opinion at the political level.…”

“…Mode of service provision: Studies by Guasch (2004Guasch ( , 2008 systematically considered aspects of renegotiation in infrastructure. They found that a large percentage of government-led renegotiations happen within six months of government elections.…”

Regulatory Agencies : Impact On Firm Performance And Social Welfare

“…Zhang, Parker, and Kirkpatrick (2005) analyze the sequencing of reforms in the electricity generation sector in developing countries. Our work is also related to the literature on the impact of regulatory agencies on the odds of renegotiation (Guasch, 2004) and on the development of financial markets (Glaeser, Johnson, and Shleifer, 2001).…”