Grain production management to reduce global warming potential under financial constraints and time value of money using evolutionary game theory

Hosseini‐Motlagh, Seyyed‐Mahdi; Johari, Maryam; Zirakpourdehkordi, Roza

doi:10.1080/00207543.2020.1773562

Cited by 38 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 73 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This method emphasizes the dynamic balance of the whole system. At present, many scholars are now using evolutionary game theory to solve problems in various fields, including economics [ 34 ], computer science [ 35 ], and management [ 36 ]. In architecture, many scholars use evolutionary game theory to solve related problems.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the literature, most papers using evolutionary game theory only focus on the two-party game, such as government and developers [ 35 ] or developers and consumers [ 36 ], without introducing the influence of the third party. In addition, the conclusion of the existing evolutionary game theory papers on construction safety education is that if the government does not participate, construction units usually do not provide safety education [ 39 ].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Liu

Wang

Song

2021

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Construction safety is related to the life and health of construction workers and has always been a hot issue of concern for government and construction units. The government can use “construction safety education” to reduce the probability of safety accidents in the construction process and avoid the loss of life and property of construction workers. To encourage construction units to provide safety education for construction workers before construction starts and promote construction workers to actively participate in safety education. In this paper, a tripartite evolutionary game model of government–construction units–construction workers is established, and the factors affecting each party’s behavior strategy are comprehensively analyzed. Firstly, evolutionary game theory is used to investigate the influence of different behavior strategies among government, construction units, and construction workers on the behavior strategies of the other two parties. Secondly, according to the events in different situations, the influence of critical factors on the evolution process of the model is analyzed. On this basis, combined with the construction experience and construction data of actual construction projects, the established model and preliminary conclusions are verified. Finally, a sensitivity analysis of all parameters is carried out. The results show that: (1) The government’s enhancement of reward and punishment is conducive to promoting the choice of "providing safety education" for construction orders and the choice of “actively participating in safety education” for construction workers, but the excessive reward will lead to the government’s unwillingness of participation; (2) The reasonable reward and punishment mechanism set by the government must meet the condition that the sum of rewards and punishments for all parties is more significant than their speculative gains, to ensure the construction safety under the evolutionary stability; (3) Increasing welfare subsidies for construction workers who choose to participate in safety education actively is an effective way to avoid unwilling participation of construction workers.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Liu

Wang

Song

2021

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…This method emphasizes the dynamic equilibrium of the system. Many scholars now use evolutionary game theory to solve problems in various fields, including economics [ 43 ], computer science [ 44 ], and management [ 45 ]. Evolutionary game theory is also widely used to solve supply chain management issues.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

Long

Liu

et al. 2020

IJERPH

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The low efficiency of the closed-loop supply chain in construction and demolition waste (CDW) recycling has restricted the green development of China’s construction industry. Additionally, the government’s reward–penalty mechanism has a huge influence on green development. This study aimed to investigate the effect of green development performance (GDP) and the government’s reward–penalty mechanism on the decision-making process of production and recycling units, as well as to reveal the optimal strategies under different conditions. Therefore, the strategies’ evolutionary paths of production and recycling units were investigated by using evolutionary game theory. Firstly, an evolutionary game model between production units and recycling units was proposed under the government’s reward–penalty mechanism. Then, the evolutionary stability strategies in different scenarios were discussed. Finally, the effects of the relevant parameters on the evolutionary paths of the game model were analyzed using numerical simulations. The main conclusions are as follows. (1) When the range of GDP changes, the evolutionary stable strategy changes accordingly. GDP plays a positive role in promoting the high-quality development of the CDW recycling supply chain, but an increase in GDP can easily lead to the simultaneous motivation of free-riding. (2) The government’s reward–penalty mechanism effectively regulates the decision-making process of production and recycling units. An increase in the subsidy rate and supervision probability helps to reduce free-riding behavior. Moreover, the incentive effect of the subsidy probability on recycling units is more obvious, while the effect of the supervision probability on improving the motivation of active participation for production units is more remarkable. This paper not only provides a decision-making basis to ensure production and recycling units to make optimal strategy choices under different conditions but also provides a reference for the government to formulate a reasonable reward–penalty mechanism that is conducive to a macro-control market.

show abstract

“…As carbon emission reduction is concerned, manufacturers have a direct relation to assume this responsibility and also manage to invest in this area [12]. In fact, economic and environmental benefits can be achieved simultaneously [13], and external factors could do something to guide the 2 Complexity manufactures and the supply chain [14,15]. Recently, for promoting the production and consumption of low-carbon products, governments of the world are concerned about how the supply chain decision-making will be influenced by different carbon emission reduction measures [16].…”

Section: Incentive Mechanism Of Government Carbon Subsidiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Based on the above literature review, the existing research has built a solid base for the related fields; however, there are still research gaps to fill. First, most works studied carbon subsidy strategy for recycling or remanufacturing of electronic products [18][19][20][21]; although several studies have investigated supply chains under the governments' carbon subsidy [12,14,15], they are not applied to the e-commerce supply chain. Second, fair concerns exist in different backgrounds, but most of them studied that between the retailers and manufacturers in the supply chain of ordinary products [24,27,29,31]; even though there are researches related to online or low-carbon background, they do not consider them together [23,30].…”

Section: Supply Chain Coordinationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Decision and Coordination of Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain with Government Carbon Subsidies and Fairness Concerns

et al. 2020

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

More low-carbon products help fight climate change and environmental problems. Governments consider encouraging the manufacturer’s initiative of producing low-carbon products by providing subsidies. However, when the manufacturer sells low-carbon products through the e-commerce platform, fairness concerns arise because of the profit difference. So, this paper builds game models to study decision behavior in the low-carbon e-commerce supply chain when the manufacturer receives government carbon subsidies and has fairness concerns. Our findings show that consumers’ preference for low-carbon products will be conducive to the operation of the supply chain. So it is necessary to popularize low-carbon products. The effect of government subsidies on supply chain decisions is different from fairness concerns. Government subsidies are positive factors in the supply chain operation, which can stimulate the manufacturer to make low-carbon products as expected and choose the high quality-high price development mode. This will help improve the profit of enterprises in the supply chain but cannot effectively stimulate the e-commerce platform to increase its service level. By contrast, the manufacturer’s fairness concerns are negative factors, which make the manufacturer prefer to adopt a low quality-low price development mode to improve their utility. This offsets the positive effect of government subsidies. It turns out that the profit of both node enterprises and the supply chain system has declined. But, fairness concerns are an important way to express the manufacturer’s demand. Finally, the joint allocation contract of cost and profit designed by comprehensively considering the effect of government subsidies and fairness concerns can make the supply chain coordinated. However, even as positive factors, only within a specific range do government subsidies help coordinate the supply chain, but not the more, the better.

show abstract

Grain production management to reduce global warming potential under financial constraints and time value of money using evolutionary game theory

Cited by 38 publications

References 73 publications

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

Evolutionary Process of Promoting Construction Safety Education to Avoid Construction Safety Accidents in China

An Evolutionary Game Theory Study for Construction and Demolition Waste Recycling Considering Green Development Performance under the Chinese Government’s Reward–Penalty Mechanism

Decision and Coordination of Low-Carbon E-Commerce Supply Chain with Government Carbon Subsidies and Fairness Concerns

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About