Governors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources as Sources of Administrative Influence

Woods, Neal D.; Baranowski, Michael

doi:10.1080/01900690701225606

Cited by 10 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…The utility of procedural controls as a mechanism for political influence is a matter of some dispute. Although some statistical analyses of agency behavior have found that procedural requirements are correlated with increased political influence (Potoski & Woods 2001;Woods & Baranowski 2007;Woods 2009) and may affect policy outcomes (Woods 2015) others have found such effects to be temporary, limited, or nonexistent (Spence 1999a;Hedge & Johnson 2002;Shapiro & Borie-Holtz 2013). Case studies suggest that the latter result may occur because agencies adapt to the procedural requirements in ways that serve to minimize their policy effects.…”

Section: Evaluating the Effects Of Regulatory Analysis Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Woods

2017

Regulation & Governance

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Well‐known theories suggest that administrative procedures may be used as mechanisms of political control of the bureaucracy. This study investigates whether three common regulatory analysis procedures—cost‐benefit analysis, risk assessment, and economic impact analysis—lead to greater influence by political officials on bureaucratic policymaking. Multivariate analyses of data from a unique survey of state administrators indicate that regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the perceived influence of elected political officials on the content of administrative rules. This association is particularly evident in cases where proposed rules are subjected to a cost–benefit test. These findings contradict prominent theories of administrative procedures, but are consistent with recent research on the political power of administrative agencies.

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Section: Evaluating the Effects Of Regulatory Analysis Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Woods

2017

Regulation & Governance

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“…During the waves of executive branch reorganization, the number of states that utilized a cabinet system of government increased from 26 to 40 between 1969 and 1982 (Beyle and Muchmore 1983, 13). The cabinet system greatly concentrates executive power because a governor’s influence over the executive branch is closely tied to her control of the selection of executive branch officers (Brudney and Hebert 1987; Conant 1988; Garnett 1980; Woods and Baranowski 2007). Conversely, state executive officials that are elected (or appointed by someone other than the state executive) have a base of power independent from the governor.…”

Section: State Executive Branch and Gubernatorial Powermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Executives possess many formal tools that affect their ability to influence executive branch activity and policy outcomes. Executive means of bureaucratic control include appointment power, rule review, budgetary control, and the ability to reorganize executive branch structures (Lewis 2005; Wiseman 2009; Woods and Baranowski 2007). The U.S. states provide an ideal setting to examine how variation in executive control influences judicial decision-making.…”

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confidence: 99%

Judicial Deference and Executive Control Over Administrative Agencies

Johnson

2014

State Politics Policy Q.

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Do judges defer to executives with increased institutional control over the executive branch? Administrative agencies play a key role in the policy implementation process. Executives could view aggressive judicial review of executive branch activity as a threat to executive power and negatively respond to perceived judicial intrusions. Governors across the country possess varying amounts of institutional authority over the agencies that comprise their states' executive branches. For example, in many states, executive branch officials are elected by the public or appointed by someone other than the governor. Increased fragmentation increases the difficulty of centralized management and decreases gubernatorial influence over the executive branch. I examine whether state supreme courts defer more to agencies in states where governors have more formal control over the executive branch. I find that state supreme courts are more likely to rule in favor of state administrative agencies in states where the governor has increased appointment power and increased power to review agency rulemaking.

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“…The formal barriers to influence are more or less permeable. Politicians, at various jurisdictional levels have a wide range of indirect methods to try and permeate, circumvent, or simply overpower formal ownership structure barriers to influence [133][134][135]. There is evidence, for example, that U.S. state-level politicians have gained considerable influence over federal agencies even though they have no formal authority over them [136][137][138].…”

Section: Political Influence Barriersmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Is Public Agency Strategic Analysis (PASA) and How Does It Differ from Public Policy Analysis and Firm Strategy Analysis?

Vining

2016

Administrative Sciences

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Public agency strategic analysis (PASA) is different from public policy analysis because public agency executives face numerous constraints that those performing "unconstrained" policy analysis do not. It is also different from private sector strategic analysis. But because of similar constraints and realities, some generic and private sector strategic analysis techniques can be useful to those carrying out PASA, if appropriately modified. Analysis of the external agency environment (external forces) and internal value creation processes ("value chains", "modular assembly" processes or "multi-sided intermediation platforms") are the most important components of PASA. Also, agency executives must focus on feasible alternatives. In sum, PASA must be practical. But public executives need to take seriously public value, and specifically social efficiency, when engaging in PASA. Unless they do so, their strategic analyses will not have normative legitimacy because enhancing public value is not the same as in some versions of public value or in agency "profit maximization". Although similarly constrained, normatively appropriate public agency strategic analysis is not "giving clients what they want" or "making the public sector business case". PASA must be both practical and principled.

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Governors and the Bureaucracy: Executive Resources as Sources of Administrative Influence

Cited by 10 publications

References 23 publications

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Judicial Deference and Executive Control Over Administrative Agencies

What Is Public Agency Strategic Analysis (PASA) and How Does It Differ from Public Policy Analysis and Firm Strategy Analysis?

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