Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Woods, Neal D.

doi:10.1111/rego.12139

Cited by 8 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 54 publications

(82 reference statements)

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“…Our results are very much in line with Woods's () empirical assessment of the effects of cost–benefits requirements, showing that they have been ineffective mechanisms of political control of regulators by public officials. In the case of Brazilian regulators, however, the administrations tried to interfere not through cost–benefit procedures, but rather through systematic impoundments of agencies' budget, partisan composition of the agencies, and strategic use their vacancies.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil

Correa

Melo

Mueller

et al. 2019

Regulation & Governance

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Governments face a fundamental tradeoff between regulatory independence and control. Attempts of interference have the effect of reducing the system's level of commitment and credibility. On the other hand, an administration runs the risk that the autonomy delegated to regulators might be used to pursue outcomes that may harm their interests. This tradeoff is particularly relevant when there is an alternation of power with the arrival of a new political elite with different preferences. This paper uses data from a 2016 survey on regulatory governance applied to Brazilian regulatory agencies. This data is compared to a similar survey performed in 2005. The new survey results turn out to be surprisingly similar to those of a decade earlier, suggesting strong resilience of regulatory agencies despite significant attempts at political interference by powerful presidents. The factors explaining the resilience of regulatory governance in Brazil lie in its broader institutional endowment, which moderates the effects of executive interference.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 87%

Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil

Correa

Melo

Mueller

et al. 2019

Regulation & Governance

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“…7 These acts function as ex ante administrative procedures, which are legal constraints on agency decision making (Potoski and Woods, 2001). The purpose of these procedures is to hardwire agencies’ decision making so that future decisions reflect the preferences of the legislators who enacted the procedure (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast, 1987, 1989; Potoski and Woods, 2001; Woods, 2018). Thus administrative procedures such as PPRAs reduce agency discretion and enhance the policy influence of the legislators who enacted the procedure.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

State Agency Discretion and Entrepreneurship in Regulated Markets

Grandy

Hiatt

2020

Administrative Science Quarterly

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Barriers to entry in regulated markets are frequently conceptualized as static features that must be removed or overcome if new entrants are to successfully enter a market. But government institutions regulating markets often comprise multiple levels that exist in tension with one another due to differing incentives and motivations. We argue that the principal–agent tension between elected officials and agency bureaucrats may render regulatory barriers to entry more malleable, even in the absence of formal policy changes. To test this proposition, we bring the administrative state center stage and examine how regulatory discretion—regulatory agencies’ flexibility to interpret and implement public policies created by elected officials—can influence the market entry of new ventures. Using data on regulatory approval of hydroelectric facilities in the United States from 1978 to 2014, we find that increased state agency discretion improves outcomes for new ventures relative to incumbent firms by freeing regulatory agency officials to interpret and implement policies according to a professional motivation of public service and reducing incumbents’ political influence.

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“…Regulatory analysis, particularly benefit–cost analysis, has emerged over the course of four decades as “an integral part of government accountability—a non‐partisan tool for understanding the likely effects of regulation” (Dudley 2009). Woods finds that “more extensive regulatory analysis requirements are associated with decreases in the amount of perceived influence” of political actors (Woods 2018, p. 310).…”

Section: The Durability Of Oira's Procedures and Principlesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the durability of regulatory oversight in the United States

Dudley

2020

Regulation & Governance

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The U.S. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) is responsible for reviewing executive branch agencies' draft proposed and final regulations, coordinating the federal government's regulatory agenda, approving government collections of information from the public, and developing and overseeing the implementation of government‐wide policies related to information policy, information quality, peer review, privacy, statistical policy, and international regulatory cooperation. While some of those functions are statutorily granted, others—notably those related to regulatory policy—derive from presidential executive orders. Since U.S. presidents can, and do, rescind their predecessors' executive orders with ease, it is striking that these regulatory oversight functions, and the economics‐based framework underlying them, have not changed significantly through six very different presidential transitions. This article reflects on OIRA's evolution over the almost 40 years since the Paperwork Reduction Act created it in 1980 to understand what has made it so durable. It finds that regardless of their philosophy, presidents need an entity like OIRA to address the principal‐agent problem they face in managing the disparate agencies within the executive branch. The OIRA career staff responsible for bringing coherence to regulatory policies across the government provide analytical expertise and institutional knowledge that complement the actions of political actors in the White House. The article concludes with recommendations for allowing OIRA's roles and practices to evolve while retaining the core functions that have received bipartisan support.

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Regulatory Analysis Procedures and Political Influence on Bureaucratic Policymaking

Cited by 8 publications

References 54 publications

Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil

Political interference and regulatory resilience in Brazil

State Agency Discretion and Entrepreneurship in Regulated Markets

The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs and the durability of regulatory oversight in the United States

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