Governments and unpopular social policy reform: Biting the bullet or steering clear?

Abstract

Abstract. Under which conditions and to what extent do governments pursue unpopular social policy reforms for which they might be punished in the next election? This article shows that there exists substantial cross-cabinet variation in the degree to which governments take unpopular measures and argues that current studies cannot adequately explain this variation. Using insights from prospect theory, a psychological theory of choice under risk, this study hypothesises that governments only engage in unpopular reform if they face a deteriorating socio-economic situation, a falling political position, or both. If not, they shy away from the risk of reform. A fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fs/QCA) of the social policy reform activities pursued by German, Dutch, Danish and British cabinets between 1979 and 2005 identifies a deteriorating socio-economic situation as necessary for unpopular reform. It is only sufficient for triggering reform, however, if the political position is also deteriorating and/or the cabinet is of rightist composition.This study's findings further the scholarly debate on the politics of welfare state reform by offering a micro-foundation that helps one to understand what induces political actors aspiring to be re-elected to engage in electorally risky unpopular reform.

Anticipatory and reactive forms of blame avoidance: of foxes and lions

“…In this context, BAB is considered as a way to circumvent electoral punishment by influencing steps (2) and (3) (Hinterleitner, 2015). Scholars have examined the use of blame avoidance strategies for retrenchment purposes in various settings and have explored the conditions under which officeholders can successfully apply such strategies (Vis, 2009;Giger and Nelson, 2011;Wenzelburger, 2011;Mortensen, 2012;Jensen and Mortensen, 2014;Wenzelburger, 2014;Vis, 2016;Hinterleitner et al, 2016;Sager and Hinterleitner, 2016).…”

Do the citizens of Europe trust their police?

“…Within this study, being exploratory in nature, the 'complex' (derived without the use of remainders) and 'parsimonious' (derived with the use of remainders) solutions are considered. This approach is advocated by Wagemann and Schneider (2010), who state that both the complex and parsimonious solutions should be exposited in a fsQCA analysis (see also Vis, 2009). …”

The Political Economy of Labour Market Policies in Western and Eastern European Countries

“…Building on the classical debate on whether leftist and rightist parties play different roles in welfare state reforms (e.g. Iversen and Cusack, 2000;Huber and Stephens, 2001;Korpi and Palme, 2003), recent research has shown that the effect of political parties is conditional on socio-economic conditions (Vis, 2009;Jensen, 2012). We show that the effect of leftwing governments is conditional on socio-economic conditions.…”

“…Persistently high levels of joblessness lead to high expenditures on unemployed benefits and therefore to budgetary stress, regardless of the colour of the government (Saint-Paul 1996, Gaston andRajaguru 2008). Indeed, relying on fuzzy set qualitative analysis, Vis (2009) found that deteriorating economic situations trigger cuts in unemployment benefits by both rightist and leftist governments. However, this does not imply that partisan differences do not matter.…”