Government Insurance Program Design, Incentive Effects, and Technology Adoption: The Case of Skip‐Row Crop Insurance

Abstract

Can the availability of poorly‐designed government insurance alter technology adoption decisions? A theoretical model of technology adoption and insurance incentive effects for a high‐ and low‐risk technology is developed and explored empirically using a unique dataset of skip‐row agronomic trial data. A multivariate nonparametric resampling technique is developed, which augments the trial data with a larger dataset of conventional yields to improve estimation efficiency. Skip‐row adoption is found to increase mean yields and reduce risk in areas prone to drought. RMA insurance rules have incentive‐distorting impacts which disincentivize skip‐row adoption.

Digital Transformation of the Agricultural Sector: Pathways, Drivers and Policy Implications

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Cognitive Mechanism and Behavioral Law of Trust among Cooperative Innovation Partners in Small and Medium-sized Enterprises Based on Event Related Potentials

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Assessing effects of federal crop insurance supply on acreage and yield of specialty crops

“…Much research focuses on federal crop insurance, but mostly in the context of field crops. Some of the research analyzes the demand for crop insurance (e.g., Coble, Knight, Pope, & Williams, ; Goodwin, ; Hazell, Bassoco, & Arcia, ; Mishra & Goodwin, , ) or producer responses to crop insurance (e.g., Du, Feng, & Hennessy, ; Du, Hennessy, & Feng, ; Miao, Feng, Hennessy, & Du, ; Quiggin, Karagiannis, & Stanton, ), whereas others explore the feasibility and design of the FCIP (e.g., Annan, Tack, Harri, & Coble, 2013; Chalise, Coble, Barnett, & Miller, ; Chambers, ; Coble, Knight, Pope, & Williams, ; Gardner & Kramer, ; Goodwin, ; Goodwin & Ker, ; Ker & Goodwin, ; Ker, Tolhurst, & Liu, ; Nelson & Loehman, ; Quiggin et al., ; Skees & Reed, ; Woodard, Pavlista, Schnitkey, Burgener, & Ward, ; Woodard, Sherrick, & Schnitkey, ; Woodard & Verteramo‐Chiu, ).…”