2011
DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2010.07.002
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Government bond risk premiums in the EU revisited: The impact of the financial crisis

Abstract: n o 1 1 5 2 / f e b r ua ry 2 0 1 0 WO R K I N G PA PE R S E R I E S This paper can be downloaded without charge fromIn 2010 all ECB publications feature a motif taken from the €500 banknote. Abstract 4 Non-technical summary 5 GOVERNMENT BOND RISK PREMIUMS

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Cited by 191 publications
(76 citation statements)
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“…As the government effectively increases its share of non-performing assets, public finances deteriorate and consequently the bank"s credit risk is transferred to the public sector (Attinasi et al 2009). In a higher volatility regime, markets penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly than in a less volatile regime, notably before the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Von Hagen et al 2011). In contrast to Alter and Schüler"s (2012) research into individual countries" experiences, we argue that the private-to-public transfer of credit risk is also a characteristic at the level of the euro area.…”
Section: The Fundamentals Channel Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 42%
“…As the government effectively increases its share of non-performing assets, public finances deteriorate and consequently the bank"s credit risk is transferred to the public sector (Attinasi et al 2009). In a higher volatility regime, markets penalize fiscal imbalances more strongly than in a less volatile regime, notably before the collapse of Lehman Brothers (Von Hagen et al 2011). In contrast to Alter and Schüler"s (2012) research into individual countries" experiences, we argue that the private-to-public transfer of credit risk is also a characteristic at the level of the euro area.…”
Section: The Fundamentals Channel Hypothesiscontrasting
confidence: 42%
“…Moreover, the negative reaction of primary deficits to unemployment variations increased after 2007:03 due to the reinforcement of the automatic stabilisers. Regarding the equation for the long-term yields on government bonds, we find that its sensibility to the fundamentals increased significantly after the crisis, which we interpret as meaning that markets did not price macroeconomic fundamentals before August 2007, but started to penalise fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances much more heavily after the crisis (a result in line with the one obtained by von Hagen 2011 andDe Grauwe 2012). In fact, our results reveal that fiscal fundamentals (the debt and the primary balance to GDP ratios) are not significant before the crisis, but turn significant, and with the expected signs, afterwards.…”
Section: The Estimated Resultssupporting
confidence: 70%
“…The impact of the GDP growth rate is positive before the crisis (which is not expected), but turns negative (0.02 -0.04 = 0.02) as expected after the crisis. This structural change supports the idea that time dependent risk perceptions driven by international factors (unrelated to the fundamentals) play an important role in explaining the unfolding of the debt crisis (again in line with von Hagen 2011 andDe Grauwe 2012).…”
Section: The Estimated Resultssupporting
confidence: 55%
“…Indeed, this methodology has already been used in the literature to examine EMU sovereign spread determinants [see, e.g. Schuknecht et al (2009), Von Hagen et al (2011 or Gómez-Puig (2006 and]. …”
Section: Econometric Methodologymentioning
confidence: 99%