Governance Solutions in Listed Companies and Not-for-Profit Organizations

Abstract

This study compares governance practices and structures used in stock exchange listed companies and not‐for‐profit organizations (NPO). It aims to identify and evaluate how these two groups of organizations develop solutions and define good organizational governance practices and implications for developments of the governance of NPOs. In order to compare governance solutions, a framework was adopted based on five categories, or building blocks, existing in a governance system and addressed in different governance codes. Information was collected from NPO's by‐laws and from companies public documents. The comparison helped identify major differences and similarities between governance practices, especially targeting development aspect for NPOs.

Social entrepreneurs in challenging places: A Delphi study of experiences and perspectives

“…The multifaceted nature of SEs manifests as internal pressures to balance social and financial goals and staff motivations, along with external pressures to communicate a clear and unambiguous message of their purpose and identity (Crucke and Knockeart, 2016;Fontes-Filho and Bronstein, 2016;Mswaka and Aluko, 2015;Costanzo, et al, 2014;Tian and Smith, 2014). This is compounded by challenges such as finding practical and meaningful ways to measure and communicate their social value (Mason and Doherty, 2016) and resisting the ideologically negative perception of engaging in more commercial activities even though such actions may ultimately improve their ability to deliver social value (Liu, Takeda and Ko, 2014).…”

“…The perception of SEs' validity also emerged as a key factor that they need to address. This is clearly related to the challenge of possessing dual missions (Richards and Reed, 2016;Jenner, 2016;Martin, 2015;Cornforth, 2014;Costanzo, et al, 2014;Ebrahim, et al, 2014;Stevens, et al, 2015;Doherty, et al, 2014) along with satisficing a wide range of stakeholders (Fontes-Filho and Bronstein, 2016;Crucke and Knockeart, 2016;Costanzo, et al, 2014;Tian and Smith, 2014) and being dependent upon organisational and individual social capital (Jenner, 2016;Richards and Reed, 2015;Domenico, Haugh and Tracey, 2010).…”

“…Recognising the wide ranging and competing objectives of SEs the involvement of multiple stakeholder groups is essential in being able to ensure effective governance structures (Crucke et al, 2015;Mair, Mayer and Lutz, 2015;Larner and Mason, 2014). However, the degree of engagement of board members and their focus upon social over financial objectives can be difficult problems to manage (Crucke and Knockaert, 2016;Berge, Caldwell and Mount, 2016;Fontes-Filho and Bronstein, 2016;Mason and Doherty, 2016;Mswaka and Aluko, 2015;Brown, 2014;Tian and Smith, 2014;Costanzo, Vurro, Foster, Servato and Perrini, 2014). Mswaka and Aluko (2015) suggest that more effective governance is possible by following the stewardship model, whereby boards should act merely as stewards of the assets of the SE and do what is seen as best for the organisation as a whole.…”

“…Delphi issue: 'Measuring Social Value' Recognising the wide ranging and competing objectives of SEs the involvement of multiple stakeholder groups has been stated to be important in order to ensure effective governance structures (Crucke et al, 2015;Larner and Mason, 2014). However, the degree of engagement of board members and their focus upon social over financial objectives can be difficult problems to manage (Berge et al, 2016;Brown, 2014;Costanzo et al, 2014;Crucke and Knockaert, 2016;Fontes-Filho and Bronstein, 2016;Mason and Doherty, 2016;Mswaka and Aluko, 2015;Tian and Smith, 2014). While the achievement of financial and social goals is problematic, the mechanisms of governance are further complicated by the fact that those goals may be shifting.…”

El gobierno interno de las mayores cooperativas agroalimentarias españolas y su relación con el rendimiento

“…En cualquier caso, la falta de desarrollo en aspectos como el control y la supervisión interna, por la falta de mandatos claros como es el caso del equipo supervisor, pueden influenciar negativamente el rendimiento de las cooperativas, ; siendo menos evidentes esta falta de mecanismos externos en las sociedades de capital (Fontes-Filho y Bronstein, 2016).…”