Governance of Banking Institutions

Adams, Renée B.

doi:10.1002/9781118258439.ch23

Cited by 24 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…They may also lack the financial expertise to understand the complexity of the securitization processes banks engage in and the risks involved. This finding is in alignment with the works of Adams (2010Adams ( , 2012 which concludes that board independence may not necessarily be beneficial for banks, as independent directors may not always have the expertise necessary to oversee banking firms. This study is at variance with the agency theory which posits that the proportion of independent directors is negatively related to financial distress (Manzaneque et al, 2016).…”

Section: Financial Distress Scores (First Stage)supporting

confidence: 82%

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience

John¹,

Ogechukwu²

2018

JEBS

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The study investigates the effect of corporate governance on financial distress in the Nigerian banking industry and examines the discriminatory power of corporate governance mechanism of the board, audit committee, executive management and auditor in one model for financial distress prediction. Secondary data obtained from annual financial statements of twenty banks between 2005 and 2015 were used for the study. The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics and generalized quantile regression model. The empirical evidence from the study suggests that financially distressed banks are characterized by large board size with members who may not be well versed in banking complexities, chairmen and CEOs with significant shareholding both individually and collectively. Furthermore, the evidence also shows that distressed banks suffer major decline in customer deposits despite increase in size. The study concludes that financial distress can be caused by poor corporate governance mechanism.

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Section: Financial Distress Scores (First Stage)supporting

confidence: 82%

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience

John¹,

Ogechukwu²

2018

JEBS

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“…In contrast, Fernandes and Fitch (2009) proxy expertise as the average years of experience of the directors in the financial sector. Adams (2010) reports that controlling for size, bank boards in the United States have on average fewer outside directorships per director than nonfinancial firms. From 1965 to 1999, the board composition of U.S. BHCs has been relatively stable, with the ratio of outside directors varying around 0.85 (Adams and Mehran, 2012).…”

Section: Expertisementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Often, directors of the parent BHC will sit on the board of the subsidiaries. This differs from most nonfinancial firms which are organized along divisional lines and whose subsidiaries often do not have separate legal identities (Adams, ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 95%

Corporate Governance of Banks: A Survey

Haan

Vlahu

2015

Journal of Economic Surveys

198

105

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This paper reviews the empirical literature on the corporate governance of banks. We start by highlighting the main differences between banks and nonfinancial firms and focus on three characteristics that make banks special: (i) regulation, (ii) the capital structure of banks, and (iii) the complexity and opacity of their business and structure. Next, we discuss the characteristics of corporate governance in banks and how they differ from the governance of nonfinancial firms. We then review the evidence on three governance mechanisms: (i) boards, (ii) ownership structures, and (iii) executive compensation. Our review suggests that some of the empirical regularities found in the literature on corporate governance of nonfinancial institutions, such as the positive (negative) association between board independence (size) and performance, do not hold for banks. Also, existing work provides no conclusive results regarding the relationship between different governance mechanisms and various measures for banks’ performance. We discuss potential explanations for these mixed results.

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“…The analysis of angular correlations led to unanticipated structure in the final state of p-p and Au-Au collisions, subsequently identified with parton fragmentation in the form of minijets [3][4][5][6][7]. Two-component analysis of p-p and Au-Au spectra revealed a corresponding hard component, a minimum-bias fragment distribution associated with minijets, suggesting that jet phenomena extend down to 0.1 GeV/c [8,9].…”

Section: A Minijet Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Their manifestation (in spectrum structure and correlations) is simply redistributed within the fragment momentum distribution, and the fragment number increases. A high-p t triggered jet yield may be reduced by a factor of five within a particular p t range, but additional fragments emerge elsewhere, still with jet-like correlation structure [3,6,11].…”

Section: A Minijet Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comparison between a Minijet Model and a Glasma Flux Tube Model for Central Au-Au Collisions at sqrt NN=200 GeV

Longacre¹

2011

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In is paper we compare two models with central Au-Au collisions at √ s N N =200GeV. The first model is a minijet model which assumes that around ∼50 minijets are produced in back-to-back pairs and have an altered fragmentation functions. It is also assumed that the fragments are transparent and escape the collision zone and are detected. The second model is a glasma flux tube model which leads to flux tubes on the surface of a radial expanding fireball driven by interacting flux tubes near the center of the fireball through plasma instabilities. This internal fireball becomes an opaque hydro fluid which pushes the surface flux tubes outward. Around ∼12 surface flux tubes remain and fragment with ∼1/2 the produced particles escaping the collision zone and are detected. Both models can reproduce two particle angular correlations in the different p t1 p t2 bins. We also compare the two models for three additional effects: meson baryon ratios; the long range nearside correlation called the ridge; and the so-called mach cone effect when applied to three particle angular correlations.

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Governance of Banking Institutions

Cited by 24 publications

References 31 publications

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience

Corporate Governance and Financial Distress in the Banking Industry: Nigerian Experience

Corporate Governance of Banks: A Survey

A Comparison between a Minijet Model and a Glasma Flux Tube Model for Central Au-Au Collisions at sqrt NN=200 GeV

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