Goodbye to all that? Institutionalist theory, U.S. alliances, and Donald Trump

Abstract

In an important and stimulating article, Stephan Frühling and Andrew O'Neil argue in favor of applying institutionalist theory to understand the alliance politics of U.S. nuclear weapons strategy. But what promise does institutionalist theory really hold in thinking about highly unequal alliances nested in their particular threat environments? I argue that much work remains to be done to determine how much better institutionalist variables explain intra-alliance dynamics over alternative arguments that emphasize power and interests. Balances of power and the nature of threat environments may already account for key aspects of extended deterrent relationships supported by the United States in Europe and Asia. Ironically, the implication of this more traditional interpretation of alliances is that more continuity than change will characterize how Donald Trump will manage U.S. security relationships as President.

The nuclear education of Donald J. Trump

“…The current issue of Contemporary Security Policy includes an important exploration into the constraining role of institutions on the incoming President, which this article seeks to build upon. For example, Lanoszka (2017) concluded that due to intra-alliance politics, "more continuity than change will characterize how Donald Trump will manage U.S. security relationships as President" (p. 1). Unfortunately, emotive references to Trump There is a public perception that whoever holds the office of the American President is the sole determinant of national interests, particularly with regard to nuclear weapons policy.…”