Going Through Aporiai: The Critical Use of Aristotle’s Dialectic

Abstract

This paper challenges a widespread reading of Aristotle’s use of dialectic in the treatment of aporiai. According to this reading, the search for a resolution of an aporia is supposed to proceed by arguing against conflicting theses to refute one of them. I argue that this reading is not satisfactory and propose an alternative, based on an often overlooked distinction between two dialectical procedures, the refutation (elenchos) of a thesis and the resolution (lusis) of an argument. These two terms are employed fairly consistently by Aristotle in the treatises as well. Since an aporia requires not merely conflicting theses, but conflicting arguments for those theses, I contend that the ideal way out of aporiai involves a critical analysis of those arguments, akin to that involved in the dialectical resolution. A relevant implication of this reading is that it expands the critical use of dialectic for philosophy, and points to the specific philosophical utility of the Sophistical Refutations.

The Aporiai of Intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima Iii 4

“…On λύσις as a different dialectical tool from ἔλεγχος in diaporematic treatment, see Rossi 2017. This is an aporia because two incompatible theses appear prima facie to be both true. A way out from the Puzzle is supposed to consist in a new distinction, or in unveiling a false hidden assumption, due to which the reasoning that leads to the contradictory conclusions looks inescapable.…”

Aristotelian perplexity and well-being, then and now

“… 11. My survey of Aristotle’s uses of aporia owes much to Cleary (1995a), Rossi (2017), Rapp (2018), and especially Gelber (2018).…”

Colloquium 1 Dialectic, Persuasion, and Science in Aristotle

“…It has been pointed out in(Rossi 2017) that Aristotle's talk of 'resolving' (λυεῖν) puzzles typically involves refuting or finding a fault in one or more of the elements that generates the puzzle. My references to 'resolving' puzzles here are broader (i.e.…”