GNSS antispoofing method using the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) for multiantenna receivers

Chen, Zhiyuan; Li, Hong; Wei, Yimin; Zhou, Ziheng; Lu, Mingquan

doi:10.1007/s10291-022-01345-w

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Fig. 7 shows the difference between the clock biases t O and t A used in the security check (12), computed respectively in the legitimate and under-attack case. Indeed, the check cannot distinguish the legitimate from the under-attack scenario, since the actual differences between legitimate and fake are well below the standard deviation of the metric itself.…”

Section: B Attacks In Ideal Scenario Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A relevant example is signal quality monitoring (SQM), where the user monitors a set of metrics evaluating the quality of the correlation peaks [10], or the received signal strength, and checks that the received signal power or the carrier-to-noise-ratio matches a predefined statistic [11]. Alternatively, a receiver may use an inertial measurement unit (IMU) [13] to confirm the acceleration and movement direction, or antenna arrays to detect the angle-of-arrival of the received GNSS signals and reject signals coming from anomalous directions [12]. Other techniques involve consistency check with the position, velocity, and time (PVT) solution obtained from a cellular network [15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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On Mixing Authenticated and Non-Authenticated Signals Against GNSS Spoofing

Ardizzon,

Crosara,

Tomasin

et al. 2024

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

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Anti-spoofing techniques for current global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) authenticate signals on a single band and from a single system. However, nowadays commercial GNSS receivers commonly calculate the position, velocity, and time (PVT) solution by simultaneously utilizing signals from multiple constellations and bands, with a substantial enhancement in both accuracy and availability. Therefore, anti-spoofing techniques have recently been proposed that mix authenticated and nonauthenticated signals to increase performance without sacrificing security.In this paper, we formalize the models of such signal mixturebased authentication checks. We propose a spoofing attack generating a fake signal that leads the victim to a target PVT solution, undetected. We analytically relate the degrees of freedom of the attacker in manipulating the victim's solution to both the employed security checks and the number of open nonauthenticated signals that can be tampered with by the attacker. The performance of the considered attack strategies are tested on an experimental dataset. Finally, we assess the limits of PVTbased GNSS authentication checks where both authenticated and non-authenticated signals are used.

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Section: B Attacks In Ideal Scenario Conditionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Mixing Authenticated and Non-Authenticated Signals Against GNSS Spoofing

Ardizzon,

Crosara,

Tomasin

et al. 2024

IEEE Trans.Inform.Forensic Secur.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Otherwise, due to the geometric and kinematic differences between the GNSS satellite and the spoofer, the spoofing will disrupt consistency, so multi-agent spoofing can be detected. Chen et al [ 13 ] used the position information of multiple antennas to derive the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) of different signals. Based on the predicted and estimated values of IA-DOA, generalized likelihood ratio testing (GLRT) was performed to achieve multi-direction spoofing detection.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

GNSS Spoofing Detection via the Intersection Angle between Two Directions of Arrival in a Single Rotating Antenna

Chen,

Ni,

Lei

et al. 2024

Sensors

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Spoofing against the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is an attack with strong concealment, posing a significant threat to the security of the GNSS. Many strategies have been developed to prevent such attacks, but current detection methods based on signal direction for multi-agent spoofing require multiple antennas/receivers, leading to increased cost and complexity in implementation. Additionally, methods utilizing a moving single antenna cannot effectively detect multi-agent spoofing. Therefore, we introduce a novel spoofing-detection technique based on the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) using a single rotating antenna. The essence of this approach lies in estimating the IA-DOA between a pair of signals by utilizing the carrier-to-noise ratio (CNR) and carrier phase single difference (CPSD) of the received signal. The estimation of IA-DOA should be consistent with the prediction when there is no spoofing. With spoofing, it is difficult to accurately simulate the directionality of navigation signals, which can disrupt the consistency between the estimation and prediction of IA-DOA. Therefore, estimations and predictions of IA-DOA can be used to establish detection variables through generalized likelihood ratio testing (GLRT) to detect multi-agent spoofing. We conducted a simulation to analyze the impact of the antenna’s parameters on the detection performance and evaluated it through on-site experiments. The results indicate that the method proposed in this article can efficiently achieve real-time detection of multi-agent spoofing.

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“…A spoofing detection method using the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) is proposed. The IA-DOA method is proved to be insensitive to the platform attitude, which reduces the cost and complexity of the experiment, but this method cannot obtain the direction information about the spoofer in the airspace [21]. The multi-antenna DOA spoofing detection method is mainly based on the difference between the real signal and the spoofing signal and performs spoofing detection according to the different information of DOAs.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A GNSS Spoofing Detection and Direction-Finding Method Based on Low-Cost Commercial Board Components

et al. 2023

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The Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) is vulnerable to deliberate spoofing signal attacks. Once the user wrongly locks on the spoofing signal, the wrong position, velocity, and time (PVT) information will be calculated, which will harm the user. GNSS spoofing signals are difficult to carry out spoofing attacks in the direction of arrival (DOA) of the real signal, so the spoofing detection method based on DOA is very effective. On the basis of identifying spoofing signals, accurate DOA information of the signal can be further used to locate the spoofer. At present, the existing DOA monitoring methods for spoofing signals are mainly based on dedicated antenna arrays and receivers, which are costly and difficult to upgrade and are not conducive to large-scale deployment, upgrade, and maintenance. This paper proposes a spoofing detection and direction-finding method based on a low-cost commercial GNSS board component (including an antenna). Based on the traditional principle of using a multi-antenna carrier phase to solve DOA, this paper innovatively solves the following problems: the poor direction-finding accuracy caused by the unstable phase center of low-cost commercial antennas, the low success rate of spoofing detection in a multipath environment, and the inconsistent sampling time among multiple low-cost commercial GNSS boards. Moreover, the corresponding prototype equipment for spoofing detection and direction-finding is developed. The measured results show that it can effectively detect spoofing signals in open environments. Under a certain false alarm rate, the detection success rate can reach 100%, and the typical direction-finding accuracy can reach 5°.

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GNSS antispoofing method using the intersection angle between two directions of arrival (IA-DOA) for multiantenna receivers

Cited by 7 publications

References 15 publications

On Mixing Authenticated and Non-Authenticated Signals Against GNSS Spoofing

On Mixing Authenticated and Non-Authenticated Signals Against GNSS Spoofing

GNSS Spoofing Detection via the Intersection Angle between Two Directions of Arrival in a Single Rotating Antenna

A GNSS Spoofing Detection and Direction-Finding Method Based on Low-Cost Commercial Board Components

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