Global manipulation by local obfuscation

Implementation via Information Design in Binary‐Action Supermodular Games

“…Note that if we had considered a symmetric game, clearly the perfect coordination property would have held for partial implementation as well. Thus, the perfect coordination results in Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) (in a symmetric version of this example) and Li, Song, and Zhao (2023) (in regime‐change games) are less surprising. The perfect coordination property holds in this example despite the costs being asymmetric.…”

“…upon status quo, i.e., if n(a −i ) ≥ |I|− k(θ)), with cost c i , while the payoff of abstention (action 1) is always 0. This is a finite-state, finite-player version of the continuous-state, continuum-player regime change game studied by Shin (1998, 2004) and analyzed in the context of information design by Inostroza and Pavan (2022) and Li, Song, and Zhao (2023).…”

“…Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) also posed the question and solved for an optimal information structure in a two‐player two‐state symmetric example. A recent paper of Li, Song, and Zhao (2023) solved for an optimal information structure in regime change games. Inostroza and Pavan (2022) showed that it was without loss to assume that optimal outcomes satisfied the perfect coordination property in regime change games, which also held for the optimal outcomes in Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) and Li, Song, and Zhao (2023).…”

“…A recent paper of Li, Song, and Zhao (2023) solved for an optimal information structure in regime change games. Inostroza and Pavan (2022) showed that it was without loss to assume that optimal outcomes satisfied the perfect coordination property in regime change games, which also held for the optimal outcomes in Mathevet, Perego, and Taneva (2020) and Li, Song, and Zhao (2023). However, all these papers assume symmetric payoffs, where the perfect coordination property is less surprising 27 .…”

Constructive versus Toxic Argumentation in Debates

“…When there is a single sender, obfuscation of an initially revealed state is strategically identical to disclosure of an initially hidden state. In the information design literature with a single sender, the term obfuscation (garbling, confusion) appears synonymously to the term disclosure and is often used to emphasize the interpretation where the sender reduces information about an initially revealed state (e.g., Jimmy Chan, Seher Gupta, Fei Li and Yun Wang, 2019;Chris Edmond and Yang K Lu, 2021;Fei Li, Yangbo Song and Mofei Zhao, 2023). As seen from our paper, disclosure and obfuscation are not identical instruments when there is more than one sender.…”