Global Manipulation by Local Obfuscation: Information Design in Coordination Games

Informational Autocrats

“…As shown in Table A11, the returns to tertiary education are similar across countries with different levels of democracy (Polity2 score). 14 In online Appendix A, Table A12 shows the correlation between being highly educated and life satisfaction across nondemocracies. Table A13 shows that the correlation continues to hold after controlling for income in nondemocracies.…”

Multi‐agent Persuasion: Leveraging Strategic Uncertainty

“…The key idea is that a principal can induce any distribution of the agent's posterior beliefs that satisfies the martingale property. Recent studies have analyzed how to persuade multiple agents (e.g., Bergemann and Morris, 2016a, 2016b, 2019; Inostroza and Pavan, 2021; Li et al., 2021; Mathevet et al., 2020; Morris et al., 2020; Taneva, 2019).…”

“…This approach is motivated as follows: The principal may be unable to coordinate the agents' behavior on the principal's most preferred equilibrium, while this uncertainty about the agents' behavior could motivate the principal to be cautious and to choose an information disclosure policy under the worst‐case scenario. This approach is becoming standard (e.g., Inostroza and Pavan, 2021; Li et al., 2021; Morris et al., 2020); however, since the usual revelation principle argument does not apply, we may rely on the structure of an underlying basic game to solve for an optimal information structure.…”

“…Li et al. (2021) study persuasion in a continuum‐agent coordination game, and characterize an optimal information structure. Morris et al.…”