Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism1

Olson, Jonas

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199606375.003.0008

Cited by 25 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 11 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The best recent lengthy defence of error theory is Joyce (2001); I take from him the phrase 'non-negotiable', and the bear example is also his (chapter 7). See Olson (2011) also. Nolan et al (2005) defend an assertive kind.…”

Section: Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaethics

Kirchin¹

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Section: Further Readingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Metaethics

Kirchin¹

2012

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…2 See e.g. Mackie 1977, Joyce 2001and 2006, Olson 2010or Streumer 2013 For the purposes of this paper we bracket epistemic normativity, which raises issues beyond this paper's scope.…”

Section: What Is the Error Theory?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We will leave the exercise of figuring this out to the reader. 9 Conservationism about moral thought and discourse has been defended by Jonas Olson (see Olson 2010). To our knowledge, no one has defended conservationism about all practical normative thought and discourse.…”

Section: Against Propagandism and Conservationismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revolutionary Expressivism

and¹,

Ridge²

2014

Irrealism in Ethics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

While the meta-ethical error theory has been of philosophical interest for some time now, only recently a debate has emerged about the question what is to be done if the error theory turns out to be true. This paper argues for a novel answer to this question, namely revolutionary expressivism: if the error theory is true, we should become expressivists. Additionally, the paper explores certain important but largely ignored methodological issues that arise for reforming definitions generally and with a vengeance in the context of a radical error theory about all practical normative judgements, and suggests how these issues can be resolved.

show abstract

“…Conservationists and fictionalists agree that moral discourse is prudentially worth keeping in some form, whereas abolitionists think that it is in our interests to eradicate it. Although conservationism is not undefended (see Olson ; ), I will set it aside. I am interested in the prudential value of retaining the moral framework in some form, and focusing on the debate between fictionalists and abolitionists will make it easier to expose the general costs and benefits of moral discourse and moral judgement.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism

Ingram¹

2015

The Southern J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral properties, and that no such properties exist. After error theory is established, abolitionism is one potential way to proceed. However, many error theorists suggest that we retain moral discourse as a sort of fiction. I evaluate some attractions of both fictionalism and abolitionism, arguing that abolitionism is a plausible position. No one doubts that error theorists can be abolitionists. However, what has gone largely undiscussed is that it is open to others to be abolitionists as well. I argue that moral realists of a metaphysically robust sort can and perhaps should be abolitionists. 'Realist abolitionism' makes for a surprisingly neat theoretical package, and I conclude that it represents an interesting new option in the theoretical landscape.

show abstract

Getting Real about Moral Fictionalism1

Cited by 25 publications

References 11 publications

Metaethics

Metaethics

Revolutionary Expressivism

After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About