Getting Clearer about 'Getting Clearer': R. S. Peters and second-order conceptual analysis

Cato, Dennis

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9752.1987.tb00140.x

“…More specifically, Laverty (2009) refers to the "distinction between concepts employed at first-order (our ordinary language use), and second-order conceptual clarification. The latter is characterized as the 'spectatorial mapping' by philosophers 'of concepts employed at the first order" (see Cato, 1987, p. 35 as cited in Laverty 2009. Philosophers are capable of (and responsible for) identifying the logically necessary (and sufficient) conditions of our ordinary language-use.…”

Section: Conceptualizationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Argument, Knowledge and Ethics: Understanding Core Concepts in Philosophy by an Empirical Study on Greek University Students

Stelios

¹

,

Theologou

²

,

Iliadi

³

et al. 2020

arhe

0

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An empirical study was conducted measuring the degree to which Greek university students’ understanding of core philosophical concepts (that is, ‘argument’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘ethics’) has been shaped by the material taught in the classroom. The extent of this transition from pre-instructional conceptions to textbook formulations has been investigated through the use of a new questionnaire. Findings indicate that generally, students retain their pre-theoretical understanding of these terms. Within this framework, some formal definitions are closer to common sense (e.g. ‘ethics’) and some others aren’t (e.g. ‘knowledge’). Furthermore, the role of intuitions in this process is been evaluated, leading to the ascertainment that previous philosophical encounters seem to play a crucial role in determining actual understanding.

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Learning Our Concepts

Laverty¹

2011

Reading R. S. Peters Today

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appreciates the centrality of concepts for everyday life, however, he fails to recognize their pedagogical dimension. He distinguishes concepts employed at the first-order (our ordinary language-use) from secondorder conceptual clarification (conducted exclusively by academically trained philosophers). This distinction serves to elevate the discipline of philosophy at the expense of our ordinary language-use. I revisit this distinction and argue that our first-order use of concepts encompasses second-order concern. Individuals learn and teach concepts as they use them. Conceptual understanding is an obligation that all individuals, and not just academically trained philosophers, must fulfil. I conclude that the role of philosophy in education is to provide a conversational context for the pedagogical dimension of concepts. I draw upon the philosophies of Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, Iris Murdoch and Rush Rhees.

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Learning Our Concepts

Laverty¹

2009

Journal of Philosophy of Education

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appreciates the centrality of concepts for everyday life, however, he fails to recognize their pedagogical dimension. He distinguishes concepts employed at the first-order (our ordinary language-use) from secondorder conceptual clarification (conducted exclusively by academically trained philosophers). This distinction serves to elevate the discipline of philosophy at the expense of our ordinary language-use. I revisit this distinction and argue that our first-order use of concepts encompasses second-order concern. Individuals learn and teach concepts as they use them. Conceptual understanding is an obligation that all individuals, and not just academically trained philosophers, must fulfil. I conclude that the role of philosophy in education is to provide a conversational context for the pedagogical dimension of concepts. I draw upon the philosophies of Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, Iris Murdoch and Rush Rhees.

show abstract

Getting Clearer about 'Getting Clearer': R. S. Peters and second-order conceptual analysis

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Argument, Knowledge and Ethics: Understanding Core Concepts in Philosophy by an Empirical Study on Greek University Students

Argument, Knowledge and Ethics: Understanding Core Concepts in Philosophy by an Empirical Study on Greek University Students

Learning Our Concepts

Learning Our Concepts

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