Learning Our Concepts

Abstract

appreciates the centrality of concepts for everyday life, however, he fails to recognize their pedagogical dimension. He distinguishes concepts employed at the first-order (our ordinary language-use) from secondorder conceptual clarification (conducted exclusively by academically trained philosophers). This distinction serves to elevate the discipline of philosophy at the expense of our ordinary language-use. I revisit this distinction and argue that our first-order use of concepts encompasses second-order concern. Individuals learn and teach concepts as they use them. Conceptual understanding is an obligation that all individuals, and not just academically trained philosophers, must fulfil. I conclude that the role of philosophy in education is to provide a conversational context for the pedagogical dimension of concepts. I draw upon the philosophies of Cora Diamond, Stephen Mulhall, Iris Murdoch and Rush Rhees.

Argument, Knowledge and Ethics: Understanding Core Concepts in Philosophy by an Empirical Study on Greek University Students

“…More specifically, Laverty (2009) refers to the "distinction between concepts employed at first-order (our ordinary language use), and second-order conceptual clarification. The latter is characterized as the 'spectatorial mapping' by philosophers 'of concepts employed at the first order" (see Cato, 1987, p. 35 as cited in Laverty 2009.…”