Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism: The Decline in Regional Power under Putin

Sharafutdinova, Gulnaz

doi:10.5129/001041513805607838

Cited by 3 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…The early 2000s in Russia were a period of political and administrative (re)centralization. The strengthening of the central state and the establishment of tight top-down political control were among the most important objectives of Vladimir Putin's first two terms as president (Sharafutdinova, 2013). Welcomed initially as an important step to stabilize the highly fragmented political sphere, the reforms pushed the "pendulum" toward authoritarian consolidation (Gel'man, 2006).…”

Section: The Russian Parliamentary Opposition In the 2000s And The Fomentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Newspapers are commonly used as the "basic material" in quantitative protest research (Hutter, 2014, 349) -although 10 Russia has a number of "ethnic republics" with a high share of inhabitants of non-Russian ethnicity. Many of these regions bargained for higher independence from the center in the 1990s (Sharafutdinova, 2013) and established regional authoritarian regimes with high degrees of repression. Despite re-centralizing policies under Putin, repression is still higher in ethnically defined regions (see Zubarevich, 2012).…”

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the ‘for fair elections’ protests 2011–2012

Dollbaum

2017

Journal of Eurasian Studies

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How does co-optation of oppositional party elites influence their protest behavior in times of cross-societal protest mobilization? Rational-Choice theories of authoritarian stability postulate that opposition elites receive material incentives in parliaments that motivate them to demobilize their radical supporters, which leads to increased regime stability. Based on a novel dataset, this article examines the protest behavior of the Russian parliamentary opposition parties (the CPRF, the LDPR and JR) and their activists during the protest wave of 2011/12 as a function of each party's co-optation in the regional parliaments. Co-optation is measured by the number of leadership posts that a party holds in the regional legislature. Protest mobilization is captured by (1) the number of protest events organized by each party and (2) the aggregate number of party activists present at protest events per region. The results show clear differences between the parties: Whereas the protest behavior of the communist CPRF is not influenced by regional elite co-optation, the analysis shows negative correlations for the LDPR and JR. The results suggest that co-optation may indeed be effective in reducing protest in contentious times-but that its effect varies for different actors.

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Section: The Russian Parliamentary Opposition In the 2000s And The Fomentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the ‘for fair elections’ protests 2011–2012

Dollbaum

2017

Journal of Eurasian Studies

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“…Murzina (: 355) suggests that during the 1990s, regional political myth‐making was based on the formation of the image of the federal centre as an enemy that restricts the regions' prosperity. But it should be noted that Shaimiev actively promoted the idea that federalism is the territorial basis of democracy in Russia, which first was declared in 1990 by the first Russian president, Yeltsin himself (Sharafutdinova : 366).…”

Section: Why Is the Revival Of Ethnicity In The Russian Illiberal Conmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…), which focus predominantly on post‐Soviet nationalising states, but ignore ethnic republics within the former RSFSR (currently Russia). Although there are studies of subnational (ethnic minority) politics in Russia that focus on mobilisation in ethnic republics before Vladimir Putin (Gorenburg ; Giuliano ; Lankina ; Treisman ; Hagendoorn et al ) and on Putin's centralisation process (Goode ; Sharafutdinova ; Moses ), we still know little about ethnic minority nationalism within the Russian Federation. The exceptions are Giuliano and Gorenburg (), who study ethnic policies in Russia until 2011.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cultural nationalism and everyday resistance in an illiberal nationalising state: ethnic minority nationalism in Russia

Yusupova

2017

Nations and Nationalism

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Ethnic minority nationalism has always been one of the most important subfields of nationalism studies, yet it lacks the consideration in illiberal settings. Limitations of civil liberties and restrictive legislation have undoubtedly affected the existence and the ways to express minority nationalism when it is considered a threat to authoritarian government, which is the case of the contemporary Russian Federation. The paper provides a methodological framework that helps to investigate ethnic minority nationalism when its direct articulation is restricted. It argues that the combination of a cultural nationalism approach and complexity theory can be a fruitful way to explore minority nationalism in an illiberal nationalising state using the case of Russian ethnic minorities. It also argues that the complex context of authoritarianism and market economy creates tipping points towards the growing importance of ethnic minority identification as a basis for social solidarity.

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“…Por ejemplo, en determinadas circunstancias el discurso recentralizador puede ganar consenso si la fragmentación de poder es percibida como una amenaza y será aceptada aun por aquellos actores (como los gobernadores) que la perciben como contraria a sus intereses. 23 Asimismo, la recentralización será más probable si las élites políticas que la impulsan ganan poder dentro del aparato estatal. 24 Un segundo grupo de trabajos ha intentado develar cuáles han sido las respuestas de los gobiernos subnacionales a la recentralización.…”

Section: Acercamientos Recientes a La Recentralizaciónunclassified

La recentralización y los gobernadores: ¿por qué no siempre se oponen? Analizando el caso de México

Olmeda

Armesto

2017

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IntroducciónSi la descentralización fue prominente en la mayor parte del mundo en las décadas de 1980 y 1990, en tiempos más próximos esas reformas se revirtieron, conque comenzaron a observarse políticas de recentralización. Países tan diversos como Brasil, Sudáfri-ca, Perú, Senegal, Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, China, Colombia, Rusia y, más recientemente, México han experimentado esta tendencia, que afectó el balance de poder entre niveles de gobierno. No es sorprendente entonces que una creciente bibliografía sobre recentralización haya comenzado a desarrollarse con el objetivo de explicar este fenómeno.Una premisa compartida por estos trabajos es que la recentralización es el resultado de interacciones entre actores estratégicos ubicados en diferentes niveles de gobierno, que persiguen sus preferencias en torno a políticas. La mayoría de estos esfuerzos teóri-cos se han enfocado tanto en entender cuándo las autoridades nacionales están deseosas de recentralizar como en identificar la diversidad de factores que contribuyen a su éxito. Sin embargo, esa discusión asume que las preferencias de los actores son constantes: mientras que los políticos nacionales (por ejemplo, el presidente) siempre estarán a favor de la recentralización como una manera de incrementar el poder, los actores subnacionales (por ejemplo, los gobernadores) siempre se resistirán a estos intentos,

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Gestalt Switch in Russian Federalism: The Decline in Regional Power under Putin

Cited by 3 publications

References 9 publications

Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the ‘for fair elections’ protests 2011–2012

Curbing protest through elite co-optation? Regional protest mobilization by the Russian systemic opposition during the ‘for fair elections’ protests 2011–2012

Cultural nationalism and everyday resistance in an illiberal nationalising state: ethnic minority nationalism in Russia

La recentralización y los gobernadores: ¿por qué no siempre se oponen? Analizando el caso de México

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