Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement

Dalgaard‐Nielsen, Anja

doi:10.7228/manchester/9780719072680.001.0001

Cited by 36 publications

(18 citation statements)

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“…96 Change is gradual, with radical change only possible in the context of 'external perturbations' or 'critical junctures' -seismic and formative historical events that illustrate the failure of existing objectives and instruments of defense policy and empower new actors and policy ideas within institutions. 97 Public policy theories elaborate on the structure/agency dynamic at the heart of policy change -notably the 'advocacy coalition framework (ACF)' and 'multiple streams framework'.…”

Section: Explaining Policy Change: Critical Junctures Policy Learninmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…133 In its place, Struck developed a 35,000-strong 'rapid reaction force', designed for higher-intensity expeditionary warfare operations; 70,000 stabilizing troops for low-to medium-intensity post-conflict reconstruction/peacekeeping missions and 147,500 support/logistical forces. 134 Commanded by a single Chief of Staff and a Joint Command Headquarters), the 'rapid reaction force', combined with Struck's strengthening of the Special Operations Division (KSK), (first established under Rühe in 1996) as the 'spearhead force of the new Bundeswehr,' represents an important first step towards convergence with the British Joint Reaction Force and French EMF model. 135 The creation of a Joint Operations Command (Einsatzrat) is an important step towards the centralization of Bundeswehr command structures, a trend that started with the development of the German Army Operational Command in 1994 and has accelerated over the post-Cold War era, mirroring developments in the UK and France.…”

Section: Germany: Domestic Constraint and The Temporal Management Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…193 Neither can change be explained by analyzing the role of Chirac as a 'securitizing actor' or 'norm entrepreneur', spearheading an 'advocacy coalition' affecting 'peripheral, operational and central beliefs' of national strategic culture and building civilian consensus around change to the policy instrument. 194 In 1995 there was little consensus amongst the public concerning an all-volunteer force and only a 'nascent' advocacy coalition promoting the end of conscription. up its own model of structural reform under the guidance of General Jean-Rene Bachelet ('The Army of the 21 st Century') outlining a 'mixed model' of conscripts and professionals.…”

Section: France: Domestic Incentives and Strategic Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…108 This normative entrepreneurship by the 'gatekeepers' and 'agenda-setters' of a strategic culture re-defines actors' perceptions of their interests by refashioning the institutional rules and cognitive paradigms that persist within society and the institutions involved in defense policy agenda-setting and implementation. 109 The concept of strategic culture overlaps with the work of the Copenhagen School (CS) on 'securitization'. Whilst the CS starts with the realist understanding of security as an exceptional realm, changes to the objectives of defense policy emerge from normative processes.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…125 In cases of 'misfit' between the changing international security environment and domestic norms, convergence is either rapid and 'fundamental' (in the case of a critical juncture), or incremental, taking the form of fine-tuning. 126 However, change to the 'cultural core' is not simply the product of structural factors or 'historical pressures' 127 but depends upon the role of political leaders in the core executive and actors within the broader defense and security policy subsystem as political entrepreneurs/securitizing actors on behalf of cognitive change 128 or upon 'civilian' consensus concerning the domestic role of the armed forces. 129 However, the following section will demonstrate that military policy and the temporality of reform processes cannot be fully explained through cultural approaches.…”

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Convergence and Divergence in Post-Cold War British, French, and German Military Reforms: Between International Structure and Executive Autonomy

Dyson

2008

Security Studies

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Post-Cold War military reforms inThis article examines patterns of convergence and divergence in post-Cold War British, French and Germany military reforms and finds that it is possible to identify increasing levels of convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy. However, it uncovers significant divergence in the temporality of reform processes.1 The study argues that these patterns of convergence/divergence cannot be explained through a focus on the mediating role played by 'national strategic cultures' -'culturally-bounded' and 'institutionally-embedded' norms that 'predispose societies in general and political elites to certain patterns of behavior'. 2 through an examination of the role of 'political/norm entrepreneurs' within the core executive or actors within the wider security policy subsystem 3 , in reshaping the three layers of belief systems (peripheral, operational and central beliefs) of which strategic cultures are composed. 4 Nor is an examination of the impact of civil-military relations on the organizational culture of defense ministries and military establishments a sufficient account of policy change.5 'Culture' emerges not so much as a cause of action as a tool, resource and instrument for policy leaders concerned with the domestic political and temporal management of reform.The analysis finds that 'international structure' is the key source of change and convergence in the objectives, instruments and institutional forums of defense policy. 6 However, neo-realist accounts neglect the impact of domestic political factors in constraining the autonomy of the core executive to respond to systemic power shifts over the short-medium term and cannot adequately account for temporal divergence in military reform amongst states of broadly comparable relative material power capabilities and 'external vulnerability'.7 Hence neoclassical realism, that emphasizes the primacy of 'international structure', but also integrates the intervening role played by 'unit-level variables', such as domestic power relationships and strategic leadership, emerges as the most convincing account of convergence/divergence in military reform. As Zakaria argues: 'Foreign policy is made not by the nation as a whole but by its government. Consequently what matters is state power, not national power. State power is that portion of national power the government can extract for its purposes and reflects the ease with which central decision-makers can achieve their ends'. 9 Taliaferro highlights how states which are confronted with the same threat vary in their ability to extract and mobilize resources from domestic society: unit-level variables -state institutions, ideology and nationalism -affect whether and when states choose innovation, emulation or the continuation of existing military strategies. 10 This article responds to the research agenda outlined by Sten Rynning 11, and Gideon Rose 12 by focusing specifically on the impact of different state structures and domestic material p...

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Section: Explaining Policy Change: Critical Junctures Policy Learninmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Germany: Domestic Constraint and The Temporal Management Of mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: France: Domestic Incentives and Strategic Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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